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Conceptual Models of global Economic Growth
ABSTRACT
This dissertation postulates that the trend of 
increasing globalization of economic activities within the 
shifting features of the world economy has been the 
dominating force transforming and integrating the 
international economic structure. I adopt ecological 
theory's external view of system structure, and focus on a 
more relational view of international exchange. Using 
network methodology, I analyze the effects of global 
transactional interactions on economic growth.
This research extends concepts of the macro-urban 
approach to an analysis of international transactions.
Based on data for 93 nations over a 20-year period (1970- 
1978 and 1978-1990) from three transactional networks (93 x 
93 matrices), major effects of international trade, 
capital, and labor flows on global economic structure and 
growth are carefully examined. Results indicate that 
economic interdependencies developed in terms of network 
positions and changes in the network centralities have been 
pivotal determinants in reorganizing international 
economies and creating competitive advantages for economic 
growth for countries centrally located in the global 
production networks.
Applying difference-of-logs (growth rate) models, the 
results present robust positive effects of transactional 
networks on economic growth net of four groups of
x
alternatively hypothesized determinants (dependence, 
industrialization, human capital investment, and military 
expenditure). The results indicate that increased 
transactional linkages with the international economy have 
been beneficial rather than harmful to economic growth.
I conclude that structural position in external transaction 
networks has been the critical factor affecting growth and 
transformation in the world economy.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Economic Growth is a pivotal subject in 
macrosociology. The trend of increasing globalization of 
economic activities within the shifting features of the 
world economy is the dominating force affecting 
restructuring in the international economic hierarchy and 
the growth of national economies. Research has been 
preoccupied with dependency/world-systems theory focusing 
on the harmful or exploitative effects of asymmetric 
international exchange. Moreover, involvement in the global 
system, as measured by position in the world system, and 
various internal determinants are emphasized beyond any 
external elements.
In this dissertation I adopt ecological theory's 
external view of social and spatial hierarchy and 
socioeconomic structures. I focus on a more relational view 
of international exchange, and how it affects global 
economic structure and growth relative to internal 
variables. Considering influences from an exceptionally 
"internationalized" world, Evans and Stephens (1988) claim 
that transactional flows that cross national boundaries 
have become increasingly important relative to those that 
move within them. Hence, a country's structural position in 
multiple-transactional networks are important theoretical
1
and empirical determinants of interareal relations.
Networks of trade, capital, and labor flows are considered 
to be the critical variables necessitating change and 
growth in the world economy.
Network analysis has recently been employed in 
research on political and economic structures of the global 
economy, and on the configuration and stratification of the 
world system. Irwin and Hughes (1992) argue that concepts 
of structural position in external transaction networks are 
emerging as a central theoretical issue across all socio- 
spatial approaches. Previous research applying network 
analysis to the world systems (Nemeth and Smith 1985; Smith 
and White 1992; Snyder and Kick 1979) was restricted by 
measures of network position (global blockmodeling) and 
correspondent data sources (binary symmetric matrices). 
However, I employ Bonacich's (1987) centrality concepts and 
measures which have been successfully employed in macro- 
urban analysis (Irwin and Kasarda 1991; Irwin and Hughes 
1992), and extend this national socio-spatial analysis to 
international exchange networks. Moreover, data on trade, 
capital, and labor flows are all available in matrix-type, 
and coded as continuous flows instead of binary forms. 
Hence, analysis using centrality concepts and measures is 
particularly appropriate in testing competing theories that 
stress the importance of global economic exchange. Drawing 
on ecological theory, I expect that a global hierarchy can
be identified based on flows of international trade, 
capital, and labor, and such a hierarchy is formed as a
continuum of roles rather than a stratified model or
discrete clusters of countries. Besides, vertical (upward 
or downward) mobility is likely to occur for countries 
across geographical regions or economic levels.
I employ another measure of network centralization, 
based on Freeman's (1979) measure but modified to take 
account of the standardized centrality scores. The 
objective of using this measure is to test the degree to 
which network flows in the world economy are dominated by a 
few countries. I argue that a growing interdependence and 
multilateralization of various trading blocs will lead to a
decentralization in the global economy over time.
Eventually, the world economy is likely to result in a 
multicentric rather than hegemonic structure.
Examining the effect of global network position on 
national economic growth, I hypothesize that integration 
into the international community is necessary for growth. 
Moreover, increased transactional linkages with the 
international economy should boost rather than impede a 
country's economic growth. On the contrary, theorists of 
the political economy perspective insist that international 
exchanges are implacably opposed to Third World interests, 
and suggest that cutting ties with the international 
economy is the best development strategy. Nevertheless, the
increased adoption of market mechanisms and correspondent 
outcomes for economic growth, compounded by secular 
technological improvement, especially in transportation and 
communication, may further stimulate international 
interactions through various exchange networks. These 
trends of development seem to suggest that nonincorporation 
or marginalization in the world-system may bring the 
severest problems of all (Callaghy 1984; Iliffe 1987; 
Mytelka 1989) .
Further still, four groups of alternatively 
hypothesized determinants of economic growth (dependence, 
industrialization, human capital investment, and military 
power) are introduced in the multiple regression analysis 
to contrast their relative effects with network centrality 
measures in determining national economic growth. Finally, 
three measures of economic growth (growth rates of GNP per 
capita, The Physical Quality of Life Index, and Human 
Development Index) are included to evaluate the relative 
validities of competing measures and theories.
Concerning potential problems of modeling and 
measurement of economic growth, special attention is paid 
to the model's overall coherence in conducting this cross­
national research. In addition, to avoid biases mainly due 
to unmeasured variables, difference-of-logs (growth-rate) 
models are employed throughout the regression analyses.
Based on data for 93 nations1 over two time periods, 1970- 
1978 and 1978-1990, dynamic changes in the structure and 
hierarchy of the world economy are carefully examined.
Significance of this research
This research is a theoretical synthesis of various 
factors on the studies of global structure and economy. By 
examining essential elements and arguments of each 
theoretical approach, the present research generates a 
distinctive approach for the analysis of the world economic 
system. Unlike the diffusionist perspectives and political 
economy approach, a multiple-network analysis necessitates 
thorough examinations of international exchange patterns 
and their effect on national economic growth.
Second, the present research contributes to empirical 
designs in network analysis. Bonacich's (1987) centrality 
measure is utilized to explore the dynamic configurations 
of the world economy system, and to elaborate the empirical 
status of world-system models. Previous research (Nemeth 
and Smith 1985; Smith and Nemeth 1988; Smith and White 
1992; Snyder and Kick 1979; Steiber 1979) suggests that 
social-network analysis could be usefully employed in
xIn the multiple regression analyses, the number of 
nations is reduced to 72 due to incomplete data for some 
alternative determinants at all three time points. See 
appendix 3 for countries included in the multiple network 
analysis.
studies of international relationships between countries. 
Although the preceding "global blockmodeling" network 
approach may be conceptually appropriate to the analysis of 
international exchange patterns, this research asserts that 
techniques used for measuring (or blocking) a country's 
structural position are not appropriate. Instead, an 
alternative approach based on Bonacich's general centrality 
measure is used. Three measures of centrality, each based 
on an alternative concept of network positions, delineate 
and differentiate various exchange patterns of global 
economic structures.
Third, this research addresses empirical lacunae in 
ecological research by extending theoretical concepts 
developed in national studies (such as dominance and 
hierarchy) to the analysis of cross-national structure.
This approach equips conventional development theories with 
practical and vital ecological principles rather than 
pervasive influences of cultural factors or power relations 
to explain the world economic system.
Furthermore, this multiple-network analysis enhances 
the theoretical development of international political 
economic research. The research presents a hierarchical 
model of the world system that is based on three essential 
types of international economic networks: trade flows, 
capital dominance, and labor flows. These multidimensional 
transaction flows reflect Wallerstein's (1974) emphasis on
the dominant institutional nexus -- capitalism (balance of 
trade, capital accumulation, and labor exploitation) and 
dependency theorists' focus on sources of dependence in the 
world capitalist economy. Additionally, these transaction 
flows correspond to mainstream economists' stress on 
interactions between flows of products (economic exchange) 
and flows of production factors (labor, capital and 
economic organization). Research using a blockmodeling 
network approach were constrained to limit analysis either 
exclusively to trade circuits or other binary-typed 
international network matrices such as military, 
diplomatic, and cultural ties.
Economic outcomes in the present research are measured 
using three prominent dependent variables (growth rates of 
GNP per capita, PQLI, and HDI). These dependent variables 
are derived from two major conceptual camps - the political 
economy of growth and diffusionist perspectives. These 
multiple indicators capture different dimensions of 
development. However, using multiple indicators of economic 
development addresses several problems inherent in 
international research. First, there is a lack of consensus 
on the definition of economic development (Morris 1984). 
Second, measures of economic development encounter an 
"indexing" problem (Bollen and Appold 1993) . Accordingly, 
empirical research results in various problems including a) 
problems of excessively narrow definition of economic
development,2 b) the use of a single dimension of 
development, and c) problems of smaller samples. The 
present study therefore contributes to the on-going debate 
on the construction of indicators by evaluating the 
relative validities of the most significant measures of 
economic development.
Finally, this research provides a dynamic analysis of 
the structure of the international system. By examining 
three transactional networks in the international system 
across two time-intervals (1970-1978, 1978-1990), this 
dynamic design provides a vigorous image of the 
internationalization of markets, commodities, capital, and 
labor. This dynamic approach also allows us to compare and 
contrast the transitional effects among centrality measures 
and other internal and socio-political determinants of 
economic growth. Smith and White (1992) point out that this 
is particularly relevant in the years between mid-1960's 
and 1980's because it is a purported period of hegemonic 
decline. Most importantly, patterns and cycles of hegemony 
in the world-system are an important theoretical and 
empirical issue in international political economy (Arrighi 
1982; Bousquet 1980; Schurmann 1974; Wallerstein 1974). 
Besides, there has emerged in the previous decade a new 
trend of regioncentric strategy and the importance of
2See Stokes & Jaffee, 1982; Firebaugh and Bullock,
1987; Stokes and Anderson, 1990; and Bollen and Appold,
1993 .
understanding the uniqueness of a regional trading bloc 
within a world trade area (Kiel and Howard 1988; Hansen 
al. 1990).
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Background
In the first part of this section, major theoretical 
perspectives within the literature of development theory- 
wili be compared and contrasted according to their key 
components. Note that each theoretical approach will be 
viewed as a coherent whole although there are almost as 
many variants of the earliest approach as there are in the 
most recent one.
The most famous formulation in studies of economy and 
society was laid out by W. Arthur Lewis (1955) that "the 
advantage of economic growth is not that wealth increases 
happiness but that it increases the range of human choice." 
Neoclassical economic theorists' arguments on comparative 
advantage (Klein, Palty and Voisin 1982; Linnemann 1966) 
and Rostow's (1971) well-known theory on "The Stages of 
Economic Growth" follow the tradition concerning the effect 
of the industrialization and modernization of society on 
the quality of life of the national population. The same 
concern was articulated in the 197 0s by the ILO's "basic 
human needs" program (Todaro 1992). Recently, the basic 
needs approach to underdevelopment was further fruitfully 
elaborated (for example, Crosswell 1981; Friedmann 1979; 
London 1987; London and Williams 1988; London and Smith
10
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1988; Streeten and Burki 1978; Wimberley 1990, 1991; 
Wimberley and Bello 1992) in an attempt to explore the 
interaction effects of both international economic 
exchanges and intranational political processes on 
development.
The emergence of modernization theory in the late 
fifties and early sixties set the stage for the 
contemporary synthesis. The body of literature built around 
the concept of modernization was the first substantial set 
of writings by mainstream sociological and political 
scientists that focused on what was happening in the Third 
World (Evans and Stephens, 1988). According to 
modernization theory, economic and social development is a 
unilinear and evolutionary process. Modernization theorists 
emphasize the social, cultural, and psychological 
constraints on economic development. Hence, a western model 
of capitalism is set up for the poor countries, namely, 
poor countries should follow the path established by 
developed nations, moving as rapidly as possible from 
1 traditional" agricultural societies to "modern" urban- 
based economies (see Kelley and Williamson 1984).
Stated more specifically, modernization theory can be 
characterized as a theory of underdevelopment because its 
theoretical framework concentrates on the negative 
phenomena and manifestations of Third World societies and 
their effects on economic growth. Consequently, the
12
paradigm of success in the western developed countries as 
dominant content of world culture has been adopted in the 
argument of international relations (Meyer et al., 197 5; 
Boli-Bennett, 1979, 1980; Meyer, 1980). Clearly, 
modernization theory neglects the uniqueness of each 
culture and social structure, and the significance of 
historical context within each country. Furthermore, as 
international transactions are becoming increasingly 
important, a series of critiques was raised. This trend of 
development theories that dominates development economics 
and government policy-making in western societies can be 
grouped and called the diffusionist perspectives (see 
Wimberley 1990).
Challenges to modernization theory primarily point to 
its neglect of international factors and its conservative 
neoclassical sociological and economic premises. Due to a 
great wealth of variants existing within this camp of 
theoretical debates, they will be categorized and 
characterized as the political economy perspectives. In the 
early 1970's, the emergence of dependency/world system 
theory and international relations captured all the 
attention in this field.
Political economy perspectives draw heavily on Marxist 
theory. Therefore, theorists supporting this trend focus 
more on the asymmetric Third World development. In 
addition, the sovereignty of the nation-state and economic
13
influences arising from capitalism are the core topics.
More importantly, it emphasizes the inevitability of 
stratified structures within the world system. As Mary 
Douglas (1986) refers to the parity argument in early Greek 
thought "recurrent appeal to pairs of opposites of various 
sorts both in general cosmological doctrine and in accounts 
of natural phenomena," the reference can be made to the 
contrast position of "strong" and "weak" within the world 
system. A similar argument can be found in Dahrendorf's 
(1959) theory. The structure of a social formation remains 
the same, dominant and dominated groups, but the occupants 
change. Virtually all empirical research reaches the same 
conclusion, that is, the world system is a stable 
stratified structure with a different composition over time 
(Snyder and Kick, 1979; Bollen, 19 83; Nemeth and Smith, 
1985; Smith and White, 1992).
However, major disagreement can be found within the 
political economy perspectives. The focus is the debate 
over the absolute importance between political and economic 
sectors. They are known as the literature of international 
relations and world-system theory, respectively. Theorists 
of international relations emphasize the notion of state 
dominance, which postulates politics as ideology developed 
by capitalist economies to maintain the status-quo in the 
world stratification structure. In other words, economic 
success will never happen in the periphery countries, but
14
only provide the convenience for state elites to increase 
power and control internally. One of the most important 
figures in the theory of nation-state dominance, Boli- 
Bennett (1980), developed a global integration perspective. 
He states that dominance is measured by integration into 
the entire system, which is the degree to which the local 
economy is oriented to the world economy, the degree to 
which local politics reflect developments in world 
politics, the degree of penetration of "world culture" into 
the local culture, and so on. He contends that the world 
system contains a fairly coherent and uniform set of 
ideological and organizational standards for national 
behavior. Hence, both ideology and organizational 
implementation of ideology support the expanded dominance 
of the state as the primary mechanism for achieving success 
(Boli-Bennett, 1980).
Furthermore, Boli-Bennett's global integration 
perspective emphasizes the stability of the nation-state.
As Meyer (1980) explains: "Nation-states almost never break 
up, and almost never really unite; boundaries rarely 
change, despite all the flows and changes of interests and 
power in the system." However, Meyer's argument may not be 
valid when applied to the current situation of contemporary 
Eastern Europe. Carroll's (1984) argument on 
macroevolutionary level of organizational ecology should be 
more appropriate for analyzing the stability of the nation-
15
state. Carroll states "macroevolution posits selection of 
organizational forms as manifested through rates of form 
emergence and survival against extinction." It is apparent 
that nation-states are durable organizations, yet the 
organizational forms did change frequently according to 
long-term historical transformations.
Wallerstein's (1974) world-system theory depicts the 
importance of specific social structures within an 
historical context, and its connection with the emergence 
of a European capitalist world-economy. Clearly, 
Wallerstein's theory of world system emphasizes solely the 
economic dimension. World system theory recognized that all 
national economies are part of a worldwide division of 
labor and stressed the asymmetric character of the exchange 
relations existing between developed and developing 
nations, which are said to benefit the former (Wallerstein, 
1974) . Simply put, the European world-economy is an 
economic rather than a political entity.
Wallerstein further suggests that the techniques of 
modern capitalism and technology of modern science enabled 
this world-economy to thrive, produce, and expand without 
the emergence of a unified political structure. However, 
technological improvement, including transportation and 
communication, is not a critical factor because China had 
about the same level of technological development as 
European countries had in the sixteenth century, but it
16
never emerged as a world economic system. Moreover, each 
single and vast political regime such as China, Persia, and 
Rome were never free from political crises compared to 
Western small city-states, nation-states, or small empires.
According to Wallerstein, capitalism as an economic 
mode is based on the fact that the economic factors operate 
within an arena larger than that which any political entity 
can totally control; namely, capitalism is the political 
side of the form of economic organization. Following Marx's 
conceptualization of profit and applying it to nation­
states, Wallerstein sees national capital accumulation as 
the ability to accumulate labor-produced value over and 
above population needs of the nation, or more simply, to 
maintain favorable balance of trade (Irwin and Kasarda 
1994). Although Wallerstein insists on capitalism as the 
single dimension which is responsible for modern 
transformation, the profound influence of a broader 
connection between structural position in external 
transaction networks and internal structure within the 
world system is quite obvious.
Dependency theory also focuses on the unequal exchange 
between nations. Yet, dependency theorists recognize the 
international class structure and also take simply 
capitalism and international trade as the key factors. Its 
main contributions are to distinguish development as a 
continuous concept and to point out the dynamic
relationship within the world stratification structure over 
time. Nevertheless, this approach fails to interpret the 
rationalities for stable positions or stagnation of upward 
mobility within the semi-peripheral and peripheral areas. 
Using Canada and Mexico as examples, both have been 
characterized as having "dependent development" on the U.S. 
economy, while one is usually grouped in the core and the 
other is in the periphery (Chirot and Hall 1982; Glenday 
1989; Resnick 1989). In other words, dependency theorists 
made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the 
way the world is, but they were weak on explaining why it 
is that way (Weaver and Berger, 1984).
The other criticism is from its failure to explain why 
political independence did not lead to development for many 
Third World countries in the post-colonial period. 
Therefore, the so-called nondependency Marxist theory of 
development, one of the major variants within dependency 
theory, claims that the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment in the Third World are largely internal 
and that their solution are internal. In general, 
dependency theory may fall into a trap of mechanistic 
oversimplification, assuming that the less-developed 
countries are developing and that their internal problems 
will resolve themselves. One final note is that both world- 
system and dependency theory are developed from a regional 
base, European countries and Latin America, respectively.
18
As Evans and Stephens (1988) postulate, as long as the 
range of cases being compared remains so restricted, claims 
to the establishment of general explanatory relations must 
be considered fragile. Only by studying very different 
world-systems can we formulate a theory of structural 
transformation (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1993).
Previous Network Studies
Snyder and Kick's (1979) article was the first 
explicit attempt to use the social-network approach to 
examine the world system. By using a "blockmodeling" 
technique with CONCOR algorithm, Snyder and Kick's 
comprehensive research design set the standard for later 
studies. Breiger (1981) explains this concept in reference 
to the network of countries:
" [A] blockmodeling approach to international trade 
assigns status to positions according to [the] 
structural similarity of the nation's imports and 
exports to all other states, across types of economic 
exchange." (1981, p.357).
Examining data on international exchanges around 1965, 
Snyder and Kick argued that their results provide 
quantitative evidence for Wallerstein's model of a 
tripartite division of nations into core, periphery, and 
semiperiphery. Although their regression analysis supported 
the world-system model, Jackman (1980) criticized the basic
19
variables employed in their model as badly skewed, so that 
the estimated disturbance is likely to be heteroscedastic.
Steiber (1979) made a similar attempt to establish an 
appropriate methodology for world-systems analysis. 
Nevertheless, the results were either much more modest 
(Smith and White 1992) or the structural equivalence of 
countries in terms of their trade patterns is highly 
confounded with geography using CONCOR-like factor analysis 
(Schott 1986). Snyder and Kick's model was later elaborated 
by Nemeth and Smith's (1985) follow-up study which attempts 
to formulate a better blocking of international system 
structure. Their utilization of the data on the value of 
different types of commodity exchange allows them to 
directly access the roles that importing and exporting 
countries play in the global division of labor. However, 
the results of this approach did not improve much over 
those of Snyder and Kick. The only differences are the 
classification of certain countries into world-system roles 
and in the overall layered image of the international 
system which followed.
Smith and White's (1992) recent studies using 
refinements in network analytic techniques (blockmodeling 
with REGE algorithm) with concentration in the network of 
international trade flows, which allows a more precise 
operationalization of role equivalence, further suggests 
that social-network analysis could be usefully employed in
studies of international relationships between countries. 
However, they narrow the scope and content of analysis and 
simply attempt to rank observations (strata of countries) 
by the relevant concepts suggested by world system theory. 
Besides, the relatively important roles played by 
correlated economic exchange networks and other socio­
political indicators influencing economic growth were 
clearly left out. As London and Williams (1988) point out, 
research using merely world system theory have, by and 
large, concentrated exclusively on a state's position in 
the world economy. In addition, Chirot (1981) notes that 
dependency and world-system theorists shifted the focus of 
analysis away from the study of "modernization" and toward 
the study of "international power relations."
Implications of Centrality Measures
Two major programs have been used in applying 
blockmodeling technique for measuring structural positions 
of observations in a network. CONCOR algorithm, as one of 
two alternative bases for measuring positional proximity, 
were constructed to evaluate matrices of binary data; that 
is, either an interaction is present or not. However, 
transactions in spatial systems are usually measured by the 
magnitude and volume of interactions, since virtually all 
places have some degree of economic, information, or 
personnel exchange with all other places in the network
(Irwin and Hughes, 1992). Furthermore, Schweizer (1988) has 
shown in empirical examples how CONCOR algorithm conflates 
spatial proximity with global role structure. While the 
other method, REGE algorithm, can identify the more generic 
structural positions in a network, it may result in a 
significant loss of information due to the crude processes 
of blocking or clustering of actors and modest description 
of aggregate relations between the positions of blocks 
within strata of the world system.
Network analysis with centrality measures which have 
been notably applied in urban structural theory are 
suggested to be an appropriate measure in exploring global 
economic structure (Irwin and Kasarda 1991; Irwin and 
Hughes 1992; Irwin and Kasarda 1994; Meyer 1986; Ross 1982; 
Ross 1987) . Concepts of position in spatial interaction 
networks are pivotal to all theories of urban structure 
(Irwin and Hughes 1992). Notions such as "centrality" 
"dominance" and "hierarchy" have been important issues in 
the literature of human ecology since the early 1930's. A 
primary assumption of most urban systems research is that 
the location of the metropolis in a nationwide division of 
labor indicates its dominance or subordinate status within 
one or more of the levels of the typology (Kasarda 1974) . 
Its applicability to the worldwide division of labor has 
also been widely recognized by world system analysts 
(Castells 1985; Meyer 1986). Irwin and Hughes (1992), argue
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that concepts of structural position in external 
transaction networks are emerging as a central theoretical 
issue across all socio-spatial approaches.
From at least three aspects, centrality measures are 
more exceptional than blockmodeling in network analysis of 
global structure. First of all, conceptualization of point 
centrality considers two interrelated issues: (1) content 
of transactions, and (2) the scope of interaction implied 
by the transaction, since the interactions affecting 
position vary greatly in content and scope (Irwin and 
Hughes 1992). Hence,
"The scope and content of the interaction influence the 
assumed positional effect of other vertices. With a 
limited scope of interaction and immediately 
deteriorating content, point centrality is determined by 
direct ties; only dyadic interactions affect network 
position. In the case of a more extensive scope, and a 
content that does not diminish with a direct 
transaction, the position of other vertices affect the 
centrality of a given point." (Irwin and Hughes 1992, 
p.19).
Three conceptualizations of point centrality - 
closeness-based, degree-based, and competitive distance - 
will be applied to the multiple-network analysis of 
transactional interactions in the structure of global 
economy. The closeness-based conceptualization which 
implies a broader scope of interaction is assumed to 
superiorly apprehend the effects of internationalization 
of markets for labor, capital, and commodity trades. 
Closeness centrality stresses the importance of both direct
and indirect access to all other vertices in the network.
In addition, this view takes the relative position of other 
vertices into account (Irwin and Hughes 1992) . Irwin and 
Kasarda's (1991) research on "Air Passenger Linkages and 
Employment Growth" provides a good example of such effects. 
On the other hand, degree-based conceptualization views 
network position as a function of direct interaction among 
vertices. It can be utilized as a measure of comparison 
with closeness centrality and evaluates their relative 
construction validities. The conception of competitive 
distance can best be seen in depicting the key term 
"dependency" for the political economy perspectives3. 
Furthermore, the formation of regional strata or blocks of 
transactional networks can also be better pictured. Unlike 
previous network analysis, measures of network were 
circumscribed to the sole application of directed graph 
theory that interaction has an effect simply on network 
position independent of the effects of other 
characteristics.
Besides the advantage of evoking a different view of 
network position, centrality scores as continuous measures 
are more convenient for conceptual interpretations and more
3Using 1990's international trade flow data as the 
most obvious example, the status of "dependent development" 
of Canada in the world economic system is clearly captured 
by the conceptualization of competitive-distance centrality 
measures. Canada's centrality scores in the network of 
trade flows of 1990 for closeness, degree, and competitive 
distance are 1.365, 0.627, and -.446, respectively.
accessible for statistical applications. On the other hand, 
research measuring country’s' structural position in the 
world system using blockmodels have difficulties 
translating results into a meaningful ordered association 
with a tripartite model or models with a few more strata4. 
Additionally, when applying the blockmodel analysis of 
networks into statistical models, the coarse clustering 
process causes these variables to be badly skewed.
Following Snyder and Kick's (1979) argument, we can refer 
blockmodel and centrality analysis of networks to the 
measures of "position" and "dominance." This approach 
conceptualizes position as a discrete location in the world 
system and dominance as one possible form of structural 
relations among positions or actors. However, note that 
measures based upon these centrality conceptions do not 
necessarily evaluate the efficacy of different theories; 
instead they illuminate different aspects of network 
structure (Irwin and Hughes 1992).
A Multiple-Network analysis
Previous network analysis was focused heavily on the 
articulation of political economy perspectives. Hence, the
4Wallerstein's model of a tripartite division of 
nations into core, periphery, and semiperiphery has been 
generally rejected by empirical research utilizing network 
approach analysis. For example, Snyder and Kick (1979) 
developed a 10-block partition model; Smith and White 
(1992) identified two more subblocks for the peripheries 
and semiperipheries.
study of interdependence or integration among international 
communities is often neglected. Four types of international 
networks have been employed: trade flows, military 
interventions, diplomatic relations, and conjoint treaty 
memberships. However, only trade flows consistently 
contribute to the analysis. On the other hand, a variety of 
transactional networks has been employed by ecologists 
emphasizing the increased interdependence of the economies 
of nations. Pivotal transactional flows are suggested from 
the studies of control and coordination (banking and 
corporate offices) and physical (commodities and 
passengers) linkages in the United States or regional 
international communities (Bochert 1972; Conzen 1977;
Duncan and Lieberson 1970; Filani 1973; Irwin and Kasarda 
1991; Irwin and Hughes 1992; Meyer 1986; Pappenfort 1959; 
Pred 1977; Taaffe 1962). This research operationally 
defines the internationalized global structure using three 
dimensions of international networks: trade flows, capital 
dominance, and labor flows. While these three networks 
obviously cannot exhaust various types of interactional 
contact, each of them do capture a substantively important 
aspect of transactional interactions.
International trade flows have been included virtually 
in every empirical research of world system analysis 
(Delacroix 1977; Firebaugh & Bullock 1987; Nemeth and Smith 
1985; Smith and White 1992; Snyder and Kick 1979; Steiber
1979; Stokes & Jaffee 1982). It is the principal assertion 
held by most political-economy theorists that through 
international trade core nations seize advantages from 
various forms of unequal exchange and then maintain the 
status quo in the international economy. Also, trade-flow 
networks among core nations are much denser than those with 
the other two "subordinate" strata, regardless of types of 
commodities. On the other hand, diffusionist theorists 
contend that while upward mobility from peripheral or 
semiperipheral to core nations is considered to be 
infrequent by political-economy theorists, integration into 
the world economy was shown to be beneficial for less- 
developed nations (Firebaugh 1992; Firebaugh and Beck 
1994). Disagreement can also be found from the horizontal 
dimension of internationalization. While diffusionist 
perspectives assert the comparative advantage from the 
approach of international division of labor, political 
economy theorists claim that the core creates and 
manipulates economic developments in the periphery (Amin 
1976; Castells 1984; Frank 1967; Hopkins 1982).
The network of capital dominance is measured using 
assets holdings of multinational and consortia banks among 
countries. Ecologists argue that international financial 
linkages are a pivotal key function that exerts dominance 
in intercommunity transactions. Meyer's (1986) research 
using financial network data (international bank
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headquarters-branch office link) confirms that the world 
system of cities is organized independently of national or 
world regional boundaries. However, Meyer's analysis 
focuses on the role of international finance in South 
America nations and linkages between core metropolises and 
national metropolises of South America. The present 
research expands Meyer's analysis using data that encompass 
a broader network of international financial linkages.
A network of labor flows is employed as another 
essential dimension that contributes to the trend of 
internationalization. Hollifield (1992) points out that 
state's policies towards immigration is a test of political 
and economic liberalism, and an indicator in the process of 
globalization. Hence, state's policy may reflect in their 
market's orientation (labor, capital, and commodity), 
especially labor flows. This is probably one of the few 
spheres where the state can show its sovereignty over 
multinational corporations (MNCs) within the world economy. 
Consequently, relations between foreign workers and 
development policies will remain a prominent feature of the 
international political economy.
Research issues regarding economic development and 
international migration have been developing toward 
convergence that labor exchanges will generate beneficial 
effects for both sending and receiving countries in the 
long run from arguments of diffusionist perspective as well
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as Marxist theory (Jasso and Bosenzweig 1990; Massey et al. 
1987; Massey 1988; Piore 1979; Portes and Benton 1984; 
Tienda and Wilson 1992; Brinley Thomas 1954; Dorothy Thomas 
1941; Wilson 1988). Still, debates remain diverse for 
topics related to uses of immigrant labor, immigrant social 
and cultural adaption, and labor relations (Bergquist 1984; 
Deyo 1986; and Frobel, Heinrich, and Kreye 1981; Portes and 
Walton 1981) . This research is focused on examining the 
correlations between network exchange of labor flows and 
economic growth. The argument is that the growing economic 
interdependence at the international level spurs movements 
of labor, as well as trade and investment. Differently put, 
increasing flows of labor may well serve as indicators of 
economic growth (Abowd and Freeman 1991). Aside from other 
ingredients, such as capital, cultural, technological and 
institutional, economic growth does rely heavily on the 
cycle of international labor movement.
However, due to the incompleteness of data on flows of 
foreign workers between countries, population by 
nationality is employed as a proxy. Hence, the effect of 
labor flows from exchange networks of foreign worker may be 
mingled with the ethnic division of labor within countries. 
In this instance, however, the development of ethnic 
enclaves may well denote the articulation of internal and 
external (national and global) division of labor. 
Additionally, the formation of ethnic enclaves is
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correlated with and determined by extents of production 
such as trade, capital, and investment. In other words, the 
ethnic division of labor is shaped and directed by factors 
including exports to the world-economy, and direct foreign 
investment from the multinational corporations. As Lubeck 
and Palmer (1990) suggest policies toward ethnic diversity 
and multiethnic states are crucial for achieving upward 
mobility within the global division of labor - the 
capitalist world-economy.
Competing Indicators of economic development
As mentioned earlier, measures of economic development 
can be confounded by "indexing" problems. The problem is 
caused by the lack of consensus on the definition of 
economic development. Therefore, this research employs 
three measures of economic development as dependent 
variables: growth rate of GNP per capita, the physical 
quality of life index (PQLI), and Human Development Index 
(HDI). The purpose of contrasting these measures is to test 
if growth rate of GNP per capita implies broader 
theoretical claims. Rationales for choosing these variables 
are stated as below.
The most commonly used macroeconomic indicators should 
be gross national product per capita and its growth rate. 
While criticized for failing to take into account the 
distribution of economic benefits and to reflect the depth
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and extent of economic and social ills, such as poverty, 
malnutrition, illiteracy, and generally low levels of 
living, including limited personal freedom and security, 
many economists believe that GNP per capita, expressed in 
monetary terms, appropriately adjusted, not only provides 
reliable comparative measures of relative economic 
performance, but also serves as an adequate proxy for the 
non-economic components of development - health, education, 
living conditions, and the like (Todaro 1992).
An alternative approach commonly referred to as 
"social indicators" has been developing over the past few 
decades. This approach consists of efforts to create a 
reliable composite index of basic needs satisfaction, and 
to refine the discontent and problems with GNP-related 
measures (Adelman and Morris 1967; Outright and Adams 1984; 
Dixon 1984; Larson and Wilford 1979; Morris 1979; Estes 
1984; UNDP 1990; UNRISD 1970). Within these various 
indices, the constructions went to both extremes; for 
example, Estes' INSP consists of 41 indicators, including 
such diverse factors as women's status, political 
stability, and "defense effort," while Morris' PQLI scale, 
at the other extreme, consists of only three items; infant 
mortality, life expectancy, and literacy. Even though 
criticized as being ad hoc and taking the advantage of 
measurement convenience, Morris' PQLI scale has been widely 
used (Inkeles 1993), and has the advantage that it is less
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sensitive than most measures of basic needs to differences 
among countries in customs, economic organization, and 
climate (Morris 1984).
The UN development program's HDI scale provides a much 
needed and highly informative complement to the more widely 
known but more narrowly conceived (because of its strictly 
economic orientation) annual World Development Report 
published by the World Bank (Todaro, 1992). The most 
serious criticism of this scale so far is that it fails to 
include systematic information on, and an analysis of, 
political freedoms and human rights (Kelley 1991). Since 
these two factors are less related to economic growth, HDI 
scale holds superior assessment to serve as a valid model 
for the present research.
Alternative determinants of economic growth
Four groups of alternative hypothesized determinants 
of economic growth (dependence, industrialization, human 
capital investment, and military power) are introduced in 
the multiple regression analysis to assess the relative 
effects of network centrality in determining national 
economic growth. Each group of alternative determinants 
captures principal conceptions from competing theories of 
economic development discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter.
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Investment dependence is the key term in the 
reflection of the Third World's persistent peripheral 
status, and it acts as the thrust of dependency theorists. 
Direct foreign investment (DFI, or transactional corporate 
investment (TNC)) is employed and considered to be a 
preferable indicator in the measurement of "dependence." 
Among the factors that explain economic growth in 
developing countries, capital penetration has been commonly 
characterized by scholars as a controversial factor leading 
countries to prosperity or persistent underdevelopment. 
Political economy theorists such as Wood (1986), still make 
a compelling argument that the "concessional financing" 
offered to the Third World as loans and aid has become a 
major mechanism of dependence in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Wood postulates that even the "softest" 
forms of concessional financing restrict the development 
choices possible for poor nations by enhancing the leverage 
available to the rich ones.
Conversely, theorists of diffusion perspectives argue 
that international investment is a critical catalyst 
leading countries to achieve economic development 
(Firebaugh 1992). Bias due to inadequate measurements in 
cross-national analysis is the major difficulty facing 
dependency research. As a result, foreign investment is 
concluded as having harmful long-term effect on economic 
growth. Therefore, it is essential to include direct
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foreign investment as alternative determinant in the 
regression model to examine its effects on economic growth 
relative to international networks.
Writers from the world-system perspective have also 
emphasized that pivotal role of trade in the international 
division of labor. Through unbalanced trade relationships, 
core nations accumulate labor-produced surplus value within 
the world economic system. Thus the dominance pattern of 
core and periphery are steadily formed. This viewpoint, 
while incorporating tarde as external element to political 
systems in their analysis, posits that trade remains 
internal to the capitalist world system. Hence, the effects 
of trade networks as external elements are examined 
relative to internal structure. Primary export dependence 
and export intensity are employed to test the internal path 
between "dependence" and economic growth.
Industrialization has also been depicted as a channel 
of reproduction of hierarchy of the world-economy. World- 
system and dependency theorists argue that ties of 
dependence between developed and less developed areas 
produced and now perpetuate a core-periphery division of 
labor (Wimberley and Bello 1992). In other words, core 
nations have employed these economic goals and structural 
means to pressure political and economic actors of the 
periphery and semiperiphery throwing themselves into the 
illusion of "industrialization." Similar arguments are made
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by theorists of diffusionist perspectives, however, with a 
positive and optimistic tone. Consequently, labor intensity 
(percent of labor in industry) and capital intensity 
(percent of GDP from industry) as indicators of 
industrialization are included in the regression models.
World military order is emphasized as one of the most 
important dimensions of globalization. In specifying its 
nature, Giddens (1990) states that we have to analyze the 
connections between the industrialization of war, the flow 
of weaponry and techniques of military organization from 
some parts of the world to others, and the alliances which 
states build with one another. It is assumed that the 
consequence of nations in the "Economic Third World" may 
partly result from their high expenses in building a "First 
World" in respect to weaponry. From the perspective of the 
"First World," Goldfrank (1983) contends that military 
investment has the short-run logic of protecting foreign 
investments and world stability on the one hand, while 
aiding sluggish domestic heavy industries. Nevertheless, 
Kaldor (1981) questions the long-run consequences of 
weapons refinements. In general, Webster (1989) found that 
military expenditure is an important indicator of economic 
growth.
Additionally, human capital investment is emphasized 
by both diffusionist and political economy perspectives 
(Barro and Becker 1989; Firebaugh and Beck 1994; Lucas
1988; Nemeth and Smith 1985; Romer 1990; Snyder and Kick 
1979; Wimberley and Bello 1992). Underinvestment in 
education, research, and development combined with 
overinvestment in the military sector is considered an 
essential feature of hegemonic decline (Goldfrank 1983) . 
Despite being a conventional determinant, education has 
been consistently stressed as a critical factor virtually 
in every development research. The significance of 
education is revitalized especially when the case of Japan 
and the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia 
and Latin American have been cited to support the call for 
a human resource development strategy. Since the 
international diffusion of a pro-development ideology led 
nations to expand schools and school enrollments during the 
1950-1970 period (Meyer et al. 1979), secondary school 
enrollment ratio is often used to replace primary schooling 
as the indicator measuring economic growth.
Dynamics of the World System
Political economy theorists recognize that nations may 
shift among core, semiperiphery, and periphery (Wallerstein 
1974), but the dominant pattern since the mid-nineteenth 
century shows a relative stability of the core-periphery 
grouping (Amin 197 6; Bergsen and Schoenberg 1980; Frank 
1967). In other words, this change in rank of positions in 
the world system is considered to be infrequent.
Conversely, diffusionist perspective theorists argue that 
it is likely that countries in the semi-periphery or 
periphery will achieve upward mobility in the world 
stratification.
The other issue of dynamics concerns the result of 
competition among core nations. Historically speaking, the 
cycle of competition among core nations has swung between a 
hegemonic or multicentric structure of the world system 
during the period 1945-1965 (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980; 
Chase-Dunn 1982, 1984). After that period, hegemonic 
domination has been transitory, leading to a predictable 
pattern of economic and political decline for the hegemone 
(Goldfrank 1983; Wallerstein 1974). The present research is 
seeking to explore the development path from three time 
points, 1970, 1978, and 1990.
CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FORMULATION AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Theoretical Framework
One major concern of this research is the alignment of 
conventional development theory with network conception in 
ecological theory. After reviewing the literature of 
approaches to the world economy, Irwin and Kasarda (1994) 
contend that while this network conception has always been 
an explicit theoretical basis of ecological theory, all 
current approaches, such as regional economics, central 
place theories and dependency approaches, are incorporating 
this network view. Meyer's (1986) research on relations 
between international financial metropolises and South 
American cities was probably the first attempt to converge 
the dependence/world-system theory and ecological paradigm. 
Though, methodologically, the network linkage between 
international bank headquarter and branch office are 
recorded in binary form rather than continuous flows, the 
study provides important clues about the integration of the 
world system of cities.
The present research is also an attempt to fill in the 
empirical lacuna of theories of development. This task is 
expected to be performed by applying major conceptions, 
such as hierarchy, dominance, and interdependence from 
ecological theory and centrality measures of network
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approach. As Meyer (1986) points out, although hierarchy, 
dominance, and specialization are ecological principles, 
these have not been emphasized in empirical research by 
ecologists or modernization theorists. On the other hand, 
neither modernization nor ecological approaches have taken 
international linkages and processes into account (Kasarda 
and Crenshaw 1991). Additionally, by studying only 
developed nations, ecologists have not been confronted with 
the economic gaps which exist at the world scale (Meyer, 
1986). Hence, research interest is focused on extending 
major ecological concepts to the world scale, as well as 
their conjunction with development literature employing a 
multiple-network analysis.
Based on the review of development literature in the 
previous chapter, we can find that there is very little 
consensus among proponents of each perspective, or even 
within variants of conceptualizations. This research is 
centered on some of the fundamental disputes over 
theoretical assumptions.
The basic assumption underlying this approach is that 
the world economy system should be examined through 
external relations relative to internal structure.
Arguments of both political economy and diffusionist 
perspectives are essentially internal views. Starting from 
different, or opposite premises, modernization and 
dependence/world-system theories agree on the internal view
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of structure of world economy. While most dependence/world 
system theorists follow Marx's conceptualization of profit 
and assert that interactional transactions are primarily 
endogenously generated from the relations of production 
within society, the focus of empirical analysis has been 
shifted to a more relational view of international exchange 
(Nemeth and Smith 1985; Smith and Nemeth 1988; Smith and 
White 1992).
Clearly, the internal view of system structure has 
been empirically or theoretical challenged by research that 
came to emphasize the important concepts of structural 
position in external transaction networks. Accordingly, 
this external orientation should be adopted by the present 
research. I assume that integration into the international 
community is necessary for economic growth. The combined 
forces of the internationalized markets for labor, capital, 
finance, and commodities are the principal factors which 
necessitate both changes of global structure and 
development of national economies.
Another related issue regarding network 
conceptualizations is the debate over the scope of 
interaction. Although reconceptualized in network terms, 
recent economic research maintains that transactions occur 
between a pair of areas; the resulting network flows are 
seen as a series of direct transactions among economies. 
Simply put, the scope of interaction is limited to the
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dyad. While theorists of political economy perspectives 
take into account direct and indirect access to the entire 
network, they view an area as less central if it is 
connected to a dominant economy. The assumption underlying 
this perspective is that more avenues for interaction 
increase competition among areas and reduce point 
centrality (Irwin and Hughes 1992). This study proposes an 
important ecological concept of interdependence upon 
measures of dominance and subdominance in a system. A 
country that optimizes direct and indirect access to the 
entire network occupies a dominant position.
The most controversial argument lies at the 
international class formation. One of the most striking 
features of global development has been the remarkable 
slowness of response between economic growth (development) 
and change of position (vertical mobility) in the hierarchy 
of the world-systems. Research interest has focused on 
testing the general validity of Wallerstein's stratified 
model of core/semiperiphery/periphery. There is 
considerable dispute over issues such as (1) the existence 
of more than three strata, and whether such strata are 
formed by discrete clusters of countries, or more of a 
continuum; (2) the distinguishing characteristics of 
membership in each stratum; and (3) the assignment of 
particular countries to these strata (Smith and White 
1992). However, these discussions are basically static; the
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dynamics of the world economy are considered in the present 
research. Additionally, both the horizontal 
(interdependence) and vertical (mobility) dimensions of 
transactional networks instead of static configurations of 
the world system characterized in terms of relations 
between countries in the respective blocks or strata are 
concentrated.
Hypotheses
Based on the preceding literature reviews and 
conceptual formulations, the following eleven major 
hypotheses are derived.
Hypothesis 1. A global hierarchy can be identified based on 
international trade, capital, and labor 
flows, and such hierarchy is formed as a 
continuum of roles rather than a stratified 
model or discrete clusters of countries.
Hypothesis 2. Vertical (upward or downward) mobility for a 
country is likely to occur in the world 
economy system.
Hypothesis 3. Network centralization is likely to decline
for the entire global networks as well as all 
geographical regions.
Hypothesis 4. The cycle of competition among core nations 
is more likely to result in a multicentric 
rather than hegemonic structure of the world 
system.
Hypothesis 5. Countries with higher centrality in trade,
capital, or labor network are more likely to 
exhibit increasing economic growth.
Hypothesis 6. Indirect transactional interactions are 
having positive effects (closeness 
centrality) for a country's economic 
performance, in addition to direct 
transactions (dyadic network flows).
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Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
• Network centralities are better predictors 
than alternatively hypothesized determinants 
on a nation's economy growth.
. Growth rate of GNP per capita are superior 
than PQLI and HDI in measuring a nation's 
economic performance.
. Network centralities have increasingly
positive long-term effects on economic growth 
over two time periods (1970-978, 1978-1990).
CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH DESIGN
Units of analysis
Nation-states are the units of analysis for the 
present research. Although individual cities may be more 
appropriate than nation-states as units of analysis,5 data 
availability has restricted our understanding of 
international networks and their social and economic 
implications. Most of the important economic flows are only 
available on a country-to-country basis. Besides, it is 
hardly controversial to specify nation-states as the most 
important actors in the modern world system (Wallerstein 
1974; Chirot 1977).
A variety of units of analysis have also been employed 
in previous research. However, each provides only a partial 
conception of the global economic network. There is a basic 
consensus among world-system analysts that the world 
economies should be the basic unit of analysis. Snyder and 
Kick (1979) used four matrices of international 
relationships: trade, military interventions, treaty
sAs Irwin and Kasarda (1994) claim, mainstream 
economists are no longer taking national boundaries as 
unequivocal spatial units, focusing instead upon 
interactions between flows of products and flows of 
production factors as two processes creating economic 
integration of areas. For these reasons, it would seem 
appropriate to concentrate on individual cities and their 
networks rather than on nation-states as units of analysis 
(Evans and Stephens 1988; Kasarda and Crenshaw 1991).
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membership, and diplomatic exchanges. The unit of analysis 
of Meyer's (1986) article is the international bank 
headquarters -- branch office link. Nemeth and Smith (1985) 
focus exclusively on flows of types of international 
commodity trade. This approach was derived in order to 
place greater emphasis on the economic base of the world- 
systerns' structure.
Data and Variables
Since the principle objective of the present research 
is to study the effect of global integration on 
stratification of the world system and economic growth on 
an international basis, no specific restrictions, except 
for data availability, are applied to exclude any country 
from this research. That is, only nations for which data 
for one or more variables are missing are excluded from 
regression models. As a result, the sample consists of 93 
and 72 countries for network analyses and regression 
models, respectively. Countries included in the regression 
analyses are comparable with respect to population size and 
GNP per capita,6 which are considered basic measures of a 
country's economic scale.
Countries are also classified into six regions, in 
order for the measurements of network centralization. This
60nly Iceland, Cyprus, and Malta have population size 
smaller than one million; however, their GNP per capita are 
all greater than six thousand.
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classification is based not on cultural realm but on a 
global spatial economic framework. These six geographic 
regions are identified as North and Latin America, the 
Asian Pacific and South Asia, Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and Southwest 
Asia.7 Countries included in this research are provided in 
Appendix C.
Table 1 provides a brief description of the variables 
and data sources used to construct these variables. With 
respect to distinctive analyses, the following discussion 
of variables is organized into three sections: measures of 
network matrices, economic growth, and alternative 
determinants of economic growth.
Network Matrices
Trade Flows. Information on the international trade flows 
of 93 countries is derived from the International Monetary 
Fund's (IMF) Direction of Trade. Total value of trade is 
assessed. The IMF's Direction of Trade is complied annually 
and contains matrix-type information on import and export 
data. Import data will be used since they are believed to 
be more accurate than export figures (see Durand 1953; 
Linnemann 1966; Smith and White 1992). Total values of
7De Blij and Muller (1992) suggest that the 
identification of North Africa/Southwest Asia region 
reflects powerful influences of its religion (the Islamic 
realm) , culture (the Arab world), and geography (the dry 
world) complexity.
Table 1. Definition of Variables and Data Source
Variable Definition Source
I. Centrality Measures 
Trade Flows*
Capital Dominance
Labor Movements
Level of Trade Centrality for a Country Direction of Trade, International Monetary Fund (1990)
Direction of Trade, ICPSR 7628 (1970, 1978)
Assets Holdings of Multinational and 
Consortia Banks Between Countries
Nationality of Foreign Worker
World Banking (1970, 1978)
International Data Base,
U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Center for the International Research (1970, 1978)
11. Other Measures of Economic Growth
Capital Penetration Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) 
Relative to GDP
Primary Export Dependence Value of Nonfuel Primary Exports as a
Percentage of Total Merchandise Exports
Export Intensity 
Labor Intensity
Capital Intensity
The Size of The Export Sector Relative 
to National Product
Percent of Labor in Industry
Percent of GDP from Industry
Defense Expenditure Military Expenditure as a percentage
of GNP
Human Capital Investment Secondary School Enrollment As a
Percentage of the Secondary-School-Aged 
Population
World Tables of Economic and Social Indicators, World Bank 
(1970, 1978, 1990)
World Bank, World Tables (1970, 1978, 1990)
World Bank, World Tables (1970, 1978, 1990)
World Bank, World Development Report (1978, 1990)
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Vol. 1 
(ICPSR 7761, 1970)
World Bank, World Development Report (1978, 1990)
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Vol. 1 
(ICPSR 7761, 1970)
Human Development Report, United Nations (1978, 1990) 
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Vol. 2 
(ICPSR 7761, 1970)
UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook (1970, 1978, 1990)
* Data for Taiwan were from Bureau of International Trade, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
(table con'd.)
Variable Definition Source
III. Indicators of Economic Growth
Economic Growth Rate Logged Differences of GNP per capita
The Physical Quality of 
Life Index (PQLI)
Human Development Index 
C HD I >
■ Infant Mortality Rate
• Life Expectancy at Birth
• Literacy Rate
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Adult Literacy and Mean Years of Schooling 
Income (measured by per capita GDP adjusted 
through a complex formula for purchasing 
power parity)
World Bank, World Development Report 
(1970, 1978, 1990)
Morris (1979)
U.N. Development Programme. Human Development Report 
(1990)
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trade are reported by their value in U.S. dollars. Although 
the information in this dataset is surprisingly complete, 
the information on Taiwan was excluded since that country 
was replaced by China in the United Nations in 1971. 
However, data on trade statistics since that time are 
constructed in the exact same format as those of the UN by 
the Bureau of International Trades (monthly Statistics of 
Exports and Imports), Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China. 
Capital Flows. This network is measuring the
international financial structure and degree of linkages. 
The variable is identified by assets holdings of 
multinational and consortia banks among countries. The 
source of data is from World Banking. The data are 
collected by first identifying the headquarter country of 
every multinational and consortia bank with assets holding 
from at least one other country. Then, assets holding of 
each country is transformed and recorded in millions of 
U.S. dollars. The source and formula in calculating 
exchange rates are based on the World Bank's annual average 
exchange rate in 1970 and 1978. Eventually, a matrix of 
capital relations between each pair of nations is 
constructed.
Labor Flows. The International Data Base contains data on 
foreign workers by country of origin. However, the 
information is extremely incomplete. For this reason, 
population by ethnic origin is employed instead. This data
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set is a release of ICPSR (8490), conducted by U.S. Dept of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Center for International 
Research. Data are organized as a series of statistical 
tables identified by country and table number. This 
exchange network is constructed from Table 83.
Measures of Economic Growth
Economic growth rate. The analysis of growth rates has 
been central to much comparative research, however, a 
methodological problem is still common for many research 
designs. The first-difference design simply defines growth 
as the difference between two time periods, Yt - Y1# where 
t and 1 refer to the later and initial time periods. 
However, problems arise when Yt and Yx are as badly skewed 
as they often are, especially (but not exclusively) in 
cross-national research (Jackman 1980). Percentage change, 
defined as 100 (Yt - Yx) /Yx, is also a simple rate measure. A 
percentage change does not take into account the length of 
the time interval, however, so the annual rate of change - 
defined as [tth root of Yt/Yx] - 1 where t is measured in 
years - is often used instead (Firebaugh and Beck 1994) .
I adopt Firebaugh and Beck's (1994) difference-of-logs 
model for the measures of growth rate. As Firebaugh and 
Beck explain, because log(Y2) - log(Yx) = log(Y2/Yx), and 
log(Y2/Yx) measures the growth rate of Y, the difference-
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of-log model is a growth-rate model.8 Hence, the 
methodological problems mentioned above can be differenced 
out, as well as bias due to omitted variables.
The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). This composite 
index is an effort made by Morris David Morris (1979) . Most 
measures of economic growth applying basic needs approaches 
are either focused on material needs or somewhat 
concentrated on a core of items such as critical foods and 
shelter (Morris 1984) . Morris has developed an index that 
is based on outputs rather than inputs. It combines life 
expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy.
Human Development Index (HDI) . HDI is the most recent
effort made by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). This index contains three key goals of development. 
These goals are longevity as measured by life expectancy at 
birth; knowledge as measured by two educational stock 
variables (adult literacy and mean years of schooling); and 
income as measured by per capita GDP adjusted through a 
complex formula for purchasing power parity. The adjustment
8Economic growth is also measured as the average 
annual percentage growth rate of GNP per capita from 1970- 
1978, and 1978-1990, with GNP per capita measured as 
described below, but not logged. This rate is computed by 
(1) taking the geometric mean of the ratios of (a) GNP per 
capita for each year from 1965-1980, and 1980-1990 to (b) 
GNP per capita for the previous year, (2) subtracting 1, 
and (3) multiplying by 100. As Firebaugh and Beck suggest, 
an annual growth rate is virtually equivalent to the 
difference-of-logs measure (r > .999 between the two 
measures for the variables used in this analysis) for 
cross-national data.
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reflects a critical assumption of rapidly diminishing 
utility returns to higher income levels (Todaro 1992).
Predictor Variables of Economic Growth
Four groups of alternative determinants of economic 
growth which have been most commonly employed in 
comparative research on effects of global economic growth 
are included in multiple regression models, relative to 
network measures of growth. These variables reflect major 
theoretical and empirical significance within the rapidly 
growing development literature. Four principal dimensions 
are postulated: dependence (capital penetration, primary 
export dependence, and export intensity), level of 
industrialization (labor intensity or capital intensity), 
human capital investment, and world military order. Note 
that in preventing similar methodological problems facing 
the dependent variables, all the alternative determinants 
of economic growth are logged to attain the model's overall 
consistency.
Capital Penetration. The most adequate measure of the 
degree of penetration by multinational capital is developed 
by Ballmer-Cao and Scheiddiger (1979) and later published 
in Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985). The measure is often 
termed PEN, which is based on the total stock of direct 
foreign investment in relation to total energy consumption 
and population. However, the measure is available only for
1967. Another similar measure derived by Muller (1988) is 
employed instead. The variable is measured by total amount 
of direct foreign investment (in million U.S. dollars) in 
relation to GDP [(DFI/GDP) x 100]. In achieving log 
transformations for the overall model,9 this negatively- 
skewed variable requires an approximately symmetric 
distribution which is accomplished with an exponential 
transformation.10 The data are from World Bank, World 
Tables of Economic and Social Indicators.
Primary Export Dependence. Primary export dependence is 
measured as the value of nonfuel primary (or unprocessed 
goods) exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports 
for three time periods. Data are from World Bank, World 
Tables. Since this variable has a potential minimal value 
of 0, which violates the argument of logarithmic 
transformation, .01 is added prior to the transformation. 
Similar procedures are applied to all other variables in 
this study having the same standing.
Export Intensity. Economic growth may be affected not only 
by primary export dependence but also by export intensity: 
the size of the export sector relative to national product
9For base 10 logarithm, the argument has to be greater 
than 0. All logs used in this research are common 
logarithms.
10The transformation is 2X/1°, where X is the percentage 
of direct foreign investment relative to GDP and 10 is a 
scaling factor. Similar transformations are performed for 
the other variables which contain negative values.
(c£. Bollen and Appold 1993). Export intensity is measured 
as the value of all merchandise exports as a percentage of 
gross domestic product. Data for total merchandise exports 
are from the World Bank, World Tables. Data for gross 
domestic product are from World Bank, World Development 
Report.
Labor Intensity. This variable is measured by the number in 
the labor force for industry as a percentage of the number 
in the total labor force. Industrial activities include 
mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, and 
public utilities. For 1978 and 1990, these are direct 
measures from World Bank, World Development Report. For 
1970, data are from Taylor and Jodice's (1983a) World 
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (ICPSR 7761). 
Capital Intensity. Data for this variable are from the same 
sources as those for labor intensity. The variable is 
measured by the contribution of the industrial sector to 
total gross domestic product at current factor cost. The 
industrial sector includes manufacturing, mining, 
construction, and electricity, gas, and water.
Human Capital Investment. Enrollment estimates for primary 
and secondary school have been available for virtually all 
countries since the mid-1960s. However, Firebaugh and Beck 
(1994) suggest that primary schooling became nearly 
universal in many less developed countries during the years 
studied here. The problem of ceiling effect may arise if
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estimates for primary school enrollment are employed.
Hence, this study used secondary enrollment as a percentage 
of the population of secondary school age children. Data 
are from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook.
Defense Expenditure. This variable concerns notions of "the 
industrialization of war" and the expenses a nation is 
willing to pay in building a "First World" military defense 
in respect to weaponry. Hence, the variable is defined as 
military expenditures as percent of gross national product. 
For 1978 and 1990, data are from UN, Human Development 
Report. Data for 1970 are from Taylor and Jodice's (1983b) 
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (ICPSR 
7761) .
A Conceptual Model
Figure 1 depicts a graphic presentation for the 
analysis. As illustrated in Figure 1, the first level of 
analysis is focused on the three international networks 
using centrality measures. Analysis of the three 
international networks using centrality measures will allow 
us to assess the relative dominant position of countries, 
and patterns of unequal exchange in the world economy (HI 
and H2). The question about consequence of competition 
among core nations can best be answered by measures of 
network or regional centralization (H3 and H4). Clearly, 
this approach is superior to Smith and White's (1992)
!Trade Flows 
Capital Dominance 
Labor Movements
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Capital Penetration 
Primary Export Dependence 
Export Intensity
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Figure 1. Conceptual Models of Global Economic Growth
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strategy by focusing on whether the U.S. was in a unique 
structural position in the time period 1965-1980.
To further assess the importance of position in the 
multiple transactional networks as competitive factors 
affecting global economic growth, multiple regression 
analyses which contain four groups of alternative variables 
(three measures of dependence, two measures of 
industrialization, a measure of defense expenditure, and a 
measure of human capital investment) are introduced. Rather 
than estimating cross-sectional or two-wave panel effects, 
the analysis employed the growth-rate models throughout the 
research, and for two separate time periods (1970-1978, 
1978-1990) to capture the dynamic effects of each measure 
upon changes in the rate of economic growth (H9).
By comparing the results of regression models, we can 
estimate the beneficial effects on the recent trend of 
global integration (H5), both direct and indirect (H6), 
Besides, the relative validities of competing measures and 
theories can be examined, as well as the relative 
significance between network centralities and alternative 
determinants (H7 and H8).
Measurement
The three international networks are represented by 
separate N X N matrices. The matrices are all coded as 
continuous flows rather than in binary forms. Bonacich's
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(1987) measure of network centrality are employed to 
measure the relative dominance of international linkages 
for all four networks. The general formula for computing 
centrality, outlined by Bonacich (quoted in Irwin and 
Hughes 1992, p.25), is:
n
Ci ( a ,  P )  =J2 ( a  +  p ^ . )  Rxj ( 1 )
j
where:
Ci = the centrality score of vertex i.
a  = a constant standardizing centrality scores across
matrices.
/3 = the nature and scope of interactions considered.
Cj = the centrality score of vertex j .
Ri;i = the magnitude of interaction between i and j .
The parameter a  standardizes the resultant scores,11 
allowing comparisons across networks of varying sizes, and 
scales centrality scores such that a value of 1.0 indicates 
average centrality in a network. The magnitude of the 
parameter /3 determines the range of indirect interactions 
taken into account. As /3 increases from 0, centrality for 
any given point increasingly becomes a function of indirect 
interactions. Values of /3 may be chosen up to a limit such 
that the absolute value of /? is less than the reciprocal of 
the largest eigen value of the exchange matrix (Irwin and 
Kasarda 1991). The three level of conceptions of centrality
11c^ is selected using an iterative routine, written in 
SAS/IML (version 6).
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- degree-based, closeness-based, and competitive distance, 
are derived by varying the /3 parameter between -1 and +1. 
Roughly speaking, (3 = 0 denotes degree centrality with 
direct contacts; 0 < /3 < 1 indicates closeness centrality 
with increasingly important indirect contacts; -1 <. j3 < 0 
determines competitive centrality, measuring harmful 
effects to central position of a vertex by contacting, 
either directly or indirectly, to other central vertices. 
Under this condition, a j8 value of .8 is used to illustrate 
a country's network centralities in the world economy. In 
addition, (3 values of .8, 0, and -.8 are used to test and 
contrast the relative validity of theoretical assumptions.
Another measure of network centralization is also 
utilized based on Freeman's (1979) measure but modified to 
take account of the standardized centrality scores.
Briefly, this measure is a summary statistic indicating the 
degree to which network flows in the world economy are 
dominated by a few countries. Network centralization, C, 
for region R is calculated as;
£  [ C ; U , P )  P)]
C R  =  ~ --- = = = = = ----- (2)
s/n x {n-1)
where (^ (a!,/!?) is the centrality score for country i,
C ^ i o i f P )  is the largest value of Ct ( a , ( 3 ) in the network, and 
n is the number of countries included in the world economy.
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The measure ranges from 0 (even distribution throughout the 
network) to 1.0 (complete domination of network flows by on 
nation). Regional centralization relative to the 
international networks and regional centralization relative 
to all countries within the same region are measured.
The objective of a multiple regression is to estimate 
the economic consequences of internationalized network 
flows in the world economy. Moreover, the results allow us 
to compare and contrast the effects of network and 
alternative measures of economic growth. A common approach 
to the explanation of growth rates in cross-national 
studies employs a first-difference (or two-wave panel) 
model:
Yt - Y0 = ck + CjYq + jS^ X,. +... + P l i X i + e, (3)
where t and 0 refer to the later and initial time period, 
respectively. The model is criticized because of its 
negligence of the length of the time interval, as well as 
its extreme vulnerability to badly skewed variables.
Jackman (1980) provides a solution to the problems by 
taking logarithms of the skewed variables. This 
transformation also takes care the measures of the growth 
rate of Y (log(Yt/Y0)) . The model is postulated as:
log Yt - log Y0 = a  + c2 log Y0 + +... -*-/S2iXi + e, (4)
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Additionally, the model further equips the estimate 
for Y0 (c2) with a substantive rather a technical meaning. 
The initial value (Y„) is originally included on the right 
of the equation to remove the effect of initial score on 
subsequent gain (i.e., to residualize Yt - Y0 by Y0) . Hence, 
it is difficult to place a substantive interpretation on 
c 1 . Since the measure of the growth rate on the left of the 
equation has standardized the initial value, any parameters 
for initial value on the right-hand side can be estimated 
and interpreted in substantive terms (Jackman 1980).
More recently, Firebaugh and Beck (1994) proposes a 
difference-of-logs (growth-rate) model with special 
attention paid to the model's overall coherence. Simple 
put, all the variables are transformed into logarithms 
throughout the model. Moreover, the possibilities of floor 
(initial value) or ceiling effects (e.g., infant survival 
probability cannot exceed 1.0) usually associated economic 
measures are taken care. The measure of growth rate can 
also be employed to reduce the biasing effects of omitted 
variables.12 The difference-of-logs form has three 
advantages: It tends to yield more robust results because
12Examples include a nation's location, topography, 
climate, rainfall, mineral resources, type and quality of 
soil, access to seaports, history, culture, economic 
system, political system, legal system, city system, 
religious composition, relationship with neighbors, and so 
on (Firebaugh and Beck 1994).
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outliers exert less influence; it avoids out-of-bounds 
estimates; and its coefficients have a ready interpretation 
as the effect of one rate on another (Firebaugh and Beck 
1994)
The study adopts Firebaugh and Beck's (1994) growth- 
rate model. The objective is to estimate the effects of 
transactional interactions on economic growth in the global 
economy. Hence, aside from three measures of network flows 
(TRADE, CAPITAL, and LABOR), three measures of dependence 
(DFI, PED, and EXPORT), two measures of industrialization 
(LABINT and CAPINT), a measure of defense expenditure 
(DEFENSE), a measure of investment in human capital (HCI), 
and a term to capture floor effect (GNP level at time 1)
are included to avoid spurious economic effects. Using
asterisks to denote logged variables, the basic growth-rate 
model is:
GNP2* - GNP/ = |30 + jSj. (DFI2* - DFl/) + /S2 (PED2* - PED/)
+ jS3 (EXPORT/ - EXPORT/) + /34 (LABINT/ - LABINT/)
+ 18S (CAPINT/ - CAPINT/) + /36 (DEFENSE/ - DEFENSE!*)
+ |S7 (HCI/ - HCI/) + (3a (TRADE/ - TRADE/)
+ jS9 (CAPITAL/ - CAPITAL/) + jS10 (LABOR/ - LABOR/)
+ f l u  (GNP/) + e, (5)
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where GNP refers to one of the three dependent variables 
(the subscripts "I" and "2" refer to one of the two time 
intervals: time 1 [1970, 1978] and time 2 [1978, 1990], 
respectively); DFI is direct foreign investment divided by 
(or relative to) gross domestic product of a country; PED 
(primary export dependence) is value of nonfuel primary 
exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports;
EXPORT (export intensity) is the size of the export sector 
relative to gross national product; LABINT (labor 
intensity) is percent of labor in industry; CAPINT ( 
capital intensity) is percent of gross domestic product 
from industry; DEFENSE (defense expenditure) is military 
expenditure as a percentage of GNP; HCI (human capital 
investment) is secondary school enrollment as a percentage 
of the secondary-school-aged population.
Two separate difference models of this form (Equation 
5) are examined at the two periods (1970-1978, 1978-1990) 
for GNP growth rate, for PQLI at first time period, and for 
HDI at second time period. Hence, a total of four models 
will be examined in evaluating the relative validity of 
dependent variables.
Three (3 parameters (-.8, 0, .8) of centrality measures
are analyzed in evaluating the relative importance between 
network and alternative economic indicators, and in 
searching for a suitable regression model. The study has 
also noted the significance of national characteristic in
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terms of economic system. Separate growth-rate models are 
examined for centrally planned economies and oil exporting 
countries to further explore the generalizability of 
results. To reassure the economic consequence of global 
network interactions, reduced-form models are estimated, 
namely to reestimate the growth-rate models without the 
network indicators.
CHAPTER FIVE 
MULTIPLE NETWORKS AND WORLD ECONOMY
The unique contribution from the application of 
network approach in studies of intermetropolitan links is 
its focus on the transaction as a direct measure of the 
relationship between places. This research further extends 
the application to international production and product 
networks by applying a degree-based measure of centrality 
to these transactional flows. Identifying both the origin 
and destination of the transaction provides a concrete 
measure of interactions among countries in the global 
economy. The centrality scores are interpreted such that 
countries with higher scores are the pivotal integrators 
within interdependent international networks rather than 
being labeled as exploiters to the notion of unequal 
exchange. Additionally, with centrality score, each country 
is able to be examined as an individual actor instead of 
being assigned to particular stratum membership for the 
analytic purpose of reflecting a typological world-system.
Contrasting Measures of Economic Dominance
The hypothesis that a global hierarchy can be 
identified based on international trade, capital, and labor 
flows is supported. Moreover, this global hierarchy is 
organized as a continuum of roles rather than a stratified
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model or discrete clusters of countries. Table 2 describes 
the relative significance among centrality measures 
( (3=. 8),12 GNP per capita, and a country's position in the 
world system. Clearly, network approach is a better and 
more straightforward measure than the others. Centrality 
scores provide a distinct picture for assessing a country's 
relative status in the world economy. In addition, applying 
network analysis, countries with less-diversified trade 
structure (e.g., oil-producing, and Scandinavian 
countries), and centrally planned economies are not 
necessarily excluded from data manipulations. In other 
words, a great concern toward bias effects caused by 
different sample composition can be minimized.
On the contrary, despite its simplicity, GNP per 
capita is a much poorer measure in presenting the relative 
status among countries. China should be the most obvious 
example. Looking at its GNP per capita, 130, 220, and 370 
for 1970, 1978, and 1990 respectively, it is difficult to 
picture that China has captured a rapid growth in trade 
centrality, from .276 to a far greater than average .824. 
World-system analysts argue that average level of GNP per 
capita may correspond to world-system status; however, this
12Bonacich has shown that the absolute value of j3 must 
be less than the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of R 
(matrix of interaction) . Without this limitation j8 loses 
its interpretation as a probability and the interpretation 
of c(ce,/3), as the expected number of paths activated by 
each transaction, is not valid. This limits the scope of 
interaction that can be taken into consideration.
Table 2. GNP per capita, Structural Positions, and Centrality Scores Based on 
Trade Flows, Labor Movements, and Capital Dominancea
GNP GNP Positions in the
per capita Growth Ratesb World Systemc Trade Centrality Capital Centrality Labor Centrality
Nation 1970 1978 1990 1970-78 1978-90 1970 1980 1970 1978 1990 1970 1978 1970 1978
United States 4970 10100 21790 .31 .33 1 1 6.240 5.705 5.723 3.723 4.107 6.025 5.466
Canada 3870 9420 20370 .39 .33 1 1 1.426 1.602 1.365 0.645 0.449 1.892 1.534
Japan 1950 7000 25890 .56 .57 1 1 2.879 2.992 3.346 1.303 1.419 0.719 0.506
Belgium-Luxembourg 2670 8760 17560 .52 .30 1 1 1.340 1.428 1.377 2.043 2.734 0.451 0.520
France 2990 8400 19520 .45 .37 1 1 2.380 2.643 2.731 1.923 3.230 2.010 1.920
German, Fed. Rep. 2850 9490 22360 .52 .37 1 1 4.132 4.326 4.552 1.368 1.338 2.959 2.628
Italy 2000 4890 16860 .39 .54 1 1 1.866 1.913 2.200 0.747 0.613 2.838 2.119
Netherlands 2560 8890 17550 .54 .30 1 1 1.479 1.733 1.530 0.464 1.693 0.477 0.548
Switzerland 3480 11690 32230 .53 .44 1 1 0.755 0.751 0.838 1.866 0.742 0.624 0.517
United Kingdom 2220 5200 16060 .37 .49 1 1 2.955 2.563 2.455 7.984 6.899 2.432 2.473
Sweden 4200 10940 23760 .42 .34 2 1 0.866 0.800 0.670 0.379 0.511 0.556 0.559
Australia 3130 8540 16680 .44 .29 2 2 0.567 0.567 0.472 1.024 0.850 0.822 1.009
New Zealand 2190 4930 12310 .35 .40 2 2 0.233 0.137 0.113 0.070 0.113 0.243 0.328
Austria 1960 6870 18980 .54 .44 2 2 0.414 0.479 0.544 0.131 0.150 0.199 0.233
Denmark 3120 10010 22680 .51 .36 2 2 0.482 0.457 • 0.398 0.181 0.419 0.173 0.129
Finland 2380 7280 24520 .49 .53 2 2 0.654 0.312 0.327 0.265 0.397 0.214 0.212
Ireland 1290 3430 10360 .42 .48 2 2 0.166 0.187 0.247 0.050 0.043 0.181 0.110
Norway 2740 9500 22830 .54 .38 2 2 0.385 0.419 0.379 0.409 0.383 . .
Spain 1110 3700 11000 .52 .47 2 2 0.434 0.596 0.871 0.055 0.113 1.351 1.166
Hong Kong 900 3750 11490 .62 .49 2 2 0.365 0.434 0.783 0.449 1.515 0.001 0.752
Korea, South 270 1190 5400 .64 .66 2 2 0.150 0.372 0.737 0.050 0.130 0.423 1.087
Nigeria 140 660 290 .67 -.36 2 - 0.131 0.412 0.136 0.050 0.043 0.464 0.781
Yugoslavia 660 2400 3100 .56 .11 2 2 0.317 0.338 0.248 0.056 0.046 0.717 0.671
Argentina 1020 1570 2400 .19 .18 2 2 0.257 0.227 0.128 0.050 0.088 1.070 0.929
BraziI 450 1640 2680 .56 .21 2 2 0.352 0.535 0.406 0.225 0.165 0.810 0.797
Venezuela 1260 3380 2560 .43 -.12 2 2 0.211 0.610 0.157 0.062 0.068 0.702 0.932
Greece 1170 3270 5990 .45 .26 3 2 0.182 0.214 0.186 0.120 0.201 0.580 0.612
Portugal 700 1890 4900 .43 .41 3 3 0.172 0.149 0.262 0.149 0.059 0.904 1.031
Ghana 250 350 390 .15 .05 3 - 0.056 0.044 0.017 0.050 0.043 0.715 0.378
Cote d'Ivoire 270 830 750 .49 -.04 3 - 0.064 0.099 0.041 0.050 0.043 . .
South Africa 740 1220 2530 .22 .32 3 - 0.329 0.284 0.186 0.064 0.043 0.554 0.599
Zambi a 440 500 420 .06 -.08 3 - 0.103 0.034 0.028 0.050 0.043 0.266 0.238
India 110 190 350 .24 .27 3 3 0.279 0.186 0.289 0.050 0.043 2.350 2.426
Malaysia 390 1150 2320 .47 .30 3 3 0.226 0.245 0.364 0.144 0.198 0.566 0.066
Pakistan 170 220 380 .11 .24 3 4 0.110 0.057 0.090 0.050 0.043 2.012 2.083
Philippines 230 480 730 .32 .18 3 3 0.150 0.147 0.131 0.070 0.078 0.199 0.309
Singapore 950 3310 11160 .54 .53 3 2 0.237 0.340 0.617 0.122 0.257 .
(table con'd.)
GNP GNP Positions in the
per capita Growth Rates World System Trade Centrality Capital Centrality Labor Centrality
Nation 1970 1978 1990 1970-78 1978-90 1970 1980 1970 1978 1990 1970 1978 1970 1978
Thai land 210 530 1420 .40 .43 3 3 0.132 0.157 0.334 0.110 0.078 0.316 0.141
Cyprus 900 3150 8020 .54 .41 3 - 0.022 0.021 0.026 0.050 0.043 0.001 0.020
Hurgary 410 1500 2780 .56 .27 3 3 0.111 0.107 0.138 0.050 0.043 0.459 0.205
Turkey 400 1220 1640 .48 .13 3 3 0.146 0.155 0.226 0.050 0.043 1.316 1.415
Iran 380 1970 2490 .71 .10 3 - 0.248 0.678 0.218 0.133 0.054 .
Israel 1830 4260 10920 .37 .41 3 3 0.112 0.128 0.142 0.050 0.043 0.225 0.218
Chi le 840 1330 1940 .26 .16 3 3 0.171 0.090 0.103 0.050 0.068 0.193 0.251
Colombia 340 850 1260 .40 .17 3 3 0.103 0.087 0.082 0.075 0.068 0.429 0.576
Peru 520 840 1160 .21 .14 3 3 0.105 0.062 0.043 0.050 0.043 0.043 0.054
Algeria 360 1380 2060 .58 .17 4 3 0.151 0.257 0.139 0.113 0.278 .
Morocco 260 650 950 .40 .16 4 3 0.078 0.217 0.074 0.073 0.098 0.260 0.279
Tunisia 280 930 1440 .52 .19 4 3 0.030 0.053 0.061 0.059 0.046 0.103 0.138
Kenya 130 310 370 .38 .08 4 - 0.051 0.056 0.047 0.050 0.043 0.392 0.464
Indonesia 80 370 570 .67 .48 4 - 0.164 0.321 0.278 0.202 0.096 0.079 0.506
Sri Lanka 180 260 470 .16 .26 4 4 0.049 0.031 0.032 0.050 0.043 0.140 0.084
Malta 760 2090 6610 .44 .50 4 - 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.050 0.043 0.006 0.021
Poland 250 1170 1690 .67 .16 4 - 0.188 0.229 0.203 0.050 0.043 1.629 0.989
Egypt 230 410 610 .25 .17 4 3 0.130 0.144 0.099 0.538 0.683 0.219 0.527
Iraq -- -- -- . 4 - 0.133 0.280 0.112 0.112 0.273 0.083 0.119
Libya 1870 7000 5500 .57 -.10 4 3 0.181 0.268 0.106 0.109 0.194 0.143 0.289
Saudi Arabia 560 7720 7060 1.14 -.04 4 - 0.227 1.121 0.483 0.307 0.359 0.436 0.306
Syrian Arab Rep. 360 1130 1000 .50 -.05 4 - 0.054 0.087 0.050 0.073 0.132 . .
Costa Rica 560 1560 900 .44 .09 4 4 0.052 0.032 0.026 0.050 0.043 0.076 0.224
Dominican Rep. 330 900 830 .44 -.04 4 - 0.030 0.530 0.023 0.050 0.043
Ecuador 290 930 980 .51 .02 4 3 0.039 0.072 0.033 0.050 0.043 0.030 0.033
Honduras 270 530 590 .29 .05 4 4 0.028 0.020 0.011 0.050 0.043 0.203 0.195
Mexi co 820 1580 2490 .28 .20 4 - 0.173 0.222 0.395 0.106 0.150 0.805 1.187
Panama 680 1290 1850 .28 .16 4 - 0.111 0.033 0.030 0.050 0.052 0.024 0.037
Cameroon 180 500 960 .44 .28 5 4 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.050 0.043 0.001 0.434
Congo 240 530 1010 .34 .28 5 5 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.050 0.043 0.142 0.182
Liberia 300 540 470 .26 -.06 5 - 0.027 0.020 0.036 0.050 0.043 0.121 0.093
Malawi 60 160 200 .43 .10 5 5 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.050 0.043 0.618 0.453
Mali 70 170 270 .39 .20 5 - 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.050 0.043 0.112 0.276
Mauritius 280 1020 2250 .56 .34 5 - 0.008 0.015 0.020 0.050 0.043 0.106 0.011
Rwanda 100 180 310 .48 .24 5 - 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.050 0.043 0.367 0.386
Tanzania 100 230 110 .36 -.32 5 - 0.044 0.023 0.011 0.050 0.043 0.389 0.502
Bangladesh 100 110 210 .04 .28 5 - 0.002 0.019 0.035 0.050 0.043 0.099 0.119
Lebanon -- -- -- . 5 - 0.065 0.039 0.028 0.262 0.077 0.058 0.114
(table con'd.)
GNP GNP Positions in the
per capita Growth Rates World System Trade Centrality Capital Centrality Labor Centrality
Nation 1970 1978 1990 1970-78 1978-90 1970 1980 1970 1978 1990 1970 1978 1970 1978
Jamaica 720 1420 1500 .29 .02 5 - 0.042 0.037 0.021 0.050 0.043 .
Uruguay 740 580 2560 .33 .21 5 - 0.041 0.028 0.025 0.050 0.068 . .
Iceland 2420 9930 22050 .61 .35 - - 0.026 0.022 0.018 0.077 0.060 0.006 0.011
China 130 220 370 .23 .23 - - 0.276 0.276 0.824 0.050 0.043 1.513 2.443
Macau -- -- -- . - - 0.042 0.010 0.020 . . 0.223 0.092
Vietnam -- -- -- . - - 0.028 0.014 0.015 . . . .
Taiwan 292 1304 6000 .65 .66 - - 0.172 0.346 0.730 . .
Bahamas, The 2700 3670 11420 .13 .49 - - 0.074 0.092 0.024 0.050 0.043 0.115 0.000
Bahrain 1250 5600 6900 .65 .09 - - 0.044 0.066 0.041 0.216 0.758 . .
Kuwait 3350 15290 16650 .66 .04 - - 0.189 0.249 0.075 0.729 1.066 0.000 0.001
United Arab Emirates 4350 21070 19860 .69 -.03 - - 0.198 0.246 0.179 0.010 0.176
Bulgaria 340 1010 2250 .47 .35 - - 0.067 0.046 0.038 0.050 0.043 0.126 0.128
Cuba -- -- -- . - - 0.047 0.042 0.028 . 0.393 0.323
Czechoslovakia 690 1915 3140 .44 .21 - - 0.180 0.129 0.185 0.050 0.043 0.565 1.417
German Democratic Rep. -- -- -- . . - - 0.117 0.105 0.075 . . 0.048 0.043
Romani a 230 1010 1620 .64 .21 - - 0.305 0.350 0.129 0.124 0.078 0.017 0.043
USSR -- • • - - 0.645 0.724 0.766 • • 1.260 1.885
SA P value of.8 is used in calculating the centrality scores.
bGNP growth rates are differences of logs between time 1 (1970, 1978) and time 2 (1978, 1990). 
cSource: Snyder and Kick (1979), Bollen (1983), Bollen and Appold (1993).
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approach only further confound the questionable GNP measure 
to the general validity of clustering models.
Measuring a distinct indicator of world-system 
position, namely a country's position in the world system 
is believed to be the most essential analytic tool in 
consistent with world-system theory. However, the effects 
of world-system position are controversial because the 
results are highly sensitive to the sample size and 
composition. While a more relational view of international 
exchange has been adopted by dependency/world-system 
perspective, the results simply lead to a conclusion that 
"hierarchical clustering algorithms offer the best method 
to identify empirical break points" (Smith and White 1992) . 
Thus, determination of boundaries between a set of zones 
remains as the theme of most world-system studies. Chase- 
Dunn's assertion provides a sound criticism toward research 
that attempts to delineate world-system stratification.
"the vocabulary of zones is just a shorthand. I don't 
see any advantage in spending time trying to define and 
empirically locate he boundaries between zones because I 
understand the core/periphery hierarchy as a complex 
continuum. Since there is upward and downward mobility 
in the system there must be cases of countries or areas 
which are in between zones, at least temporarily. For me 
it doesn't matter whether there are "really" three 
zones, four zones, or twenty zones." (Chase-Dunn 1989, 
p.214) .
Although typological results may reflect differential 
industrial structures and developmental outcomes for 
particular countries, this aggregate level of
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interpretations on world economic growth still fails to 
transform the analyses into a general comparative scheme. 
Besides, previous network analyses wasted a great deal of 
information for the metric measures because they either 
reduced each cell to a zero or a one, or were simply 
interested in grouping countries into certain categories. 
Thus, the differences of results were due more to 
interpretations of relational network than to the different 
measuring techniques.
Changes in the Global Hierarchy
This research presents a multidimensional global 
hierarchical structure in terms of trade, capital, and 
labor networks. These transactional networks are indicators 
of the economic basis of national domination in a 
capitalist world-economy. The centrality score measures the 
degree to which a country directly or indirectly mediates 
access to the entire economic networks, i.e., the degree to 
which it dominates the network interactions. Table 3 
describes the trade network centrality score and rank for 
each year (1970, 1978, and 1990) and the percent change in 
centrality score across these 20 years. This table presents 
changes of dominant roles in the trade hierarchy. During 
the 2 0-year period, the number of dominant countries, 
countries with greater than average centrality scores 
(>1.0) in 1970, 1978, or 1990, stays at 9. Besides, except
Table 3. Predominant Changes in Trade Network Centrality, 1970-1978 
and 1978-1990_________________________________________________
Nation
1970 1978 1990 Percent Change in 
Centrality Score
Centrality 
Score Rank
Centrality 
Score Rank
Centrality 
Score Rank 1970-1978 1978-1990 1970-1990
Declining Dominance
United States 6.241 1 5.705 1 5.724 1 -8.58 .33 -8.29
United Kingdom 2.955 3 2.564 5 2.456 5 -13.24 -4.22 -16.90
Canada 1.426 8 1.602 8 1.365 9 12.33 -14.80 -4.29
Sweden .867 10 .800 11 .670 17 -7.68 -16.27 -22.70
Finland .655 12 .312 31 .328 28 -52.34 5.00 -49.96
Australia .568 14 .568 17 .472 21 -0.05 -16.75 -16.79
Denmark .483 15 .457 21 .399 23 -5.29 -12.85 -17.46
Norway .385 18 .419 23 .379 25 8.78 -9.48 -1.54
South Africa .330 21 .284 32 .186 38 -13.83 -34.42 -43.49
Yugoslavia .318 22 .339 29 .249 32 6.55 -26.53 -21.72
Romani a .305 23 .352 26 .129 46 14.83 -63.19 -57.73
Argentina .257 26 .228 40 .129 47 -11.46 -43.43 -49.91
New Zealand .233 29 .137 51 .114 48 -41.08 -17.21 -51.22
Panama .111 54 .033 73 .030 70 -70.29 -7.87 -72.63
Zambia .103 59 .034 72 .028 72 -66.62 -17.78 -72.56
Ghana .056 66 .044 68 .018 85 -21.77 -59.66 -68.44
Increasing Dominance
German Fed. Rep. 4.133 2 4.327 2 4.552 2 4.70 5.21 10.16
Japan 2.879 4 2.992 3 3.347 3 3.93 11.84 16.23
France 2.381 5 2.644 4 2.731 4 11.05 3.31 14.73
Italy 1.867 6 1.914 6 2.220 6 2.53 14.96 17.87
Spain .435 16 .596 16 .872 10 37.15 46.26 100.59
Hong Kong .365 19 .435 22 .784 13 18.97 80.33 114.54
China .276 25 .277 34 .825 12 .24 197.92 198.64
Singapore .238 28 .341 28 .617 18 43.44 81.07 159.73
Malaysia .226 31 .246 38 .365 26 8.47 48.50 61.08
Mexico .174 38 .222 41 .396 24 27.97 78.17 128.00
Taiwan .172 39 .347 27 .731 16 101.35 110.80 324.44
Korea .151 45 .372 25 .737 15 146.65 97.93 388.19
Turkey .147 47 .155 47 .226 34 5.92 45.60 54.21
Thai land .132 49 .158 46 .334 27 19.44 111.71 152.87
Tunisia .031 79 .054 66 .062 58 75.36 15.29 102.18
Bangladesh .003 93 .019 84 .035 66 600.80 83.55 1186.31
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Japan, all other dominant countries were concentrated in 
either Western Europe or North America. Only Saudi Arabia 
jumped up to the top tier in 1978, while the global economy 
experienced two oil crises in the 197 0s. However, by 1990, 
the increasing competition in the trade network leaves only 
four countries (West Germany, Japan, France, and Italy) 
still capable of achieving constant progresses in their 
rank and score of trade centrality. While the decrease of 
centrality score and rank occurs in countries across all 
regions in the world economy, especially the Scandinavian 
countries, most sharp increases are concentrated in the 
Pacific Rim area. The results may well reflect the expected 
beneficial effects of increasing transactional interactions 
in the trade network. China's initiation of the open-door 
policy in 1978 certainly contributes both direct and 
indirect influences on increase of trade gains within the 
region.
Table 4 depicts the capital network centrality score 
and rank for 1970 and 197 8 and the percent change in 
centrality score in this period. The result shows that 
capital network reflect a much more dynamic and unstable 
transformation compared to that of trade. Countries 
experiencing declining trade centralities such as United 
States and Scandinavian countries were achieving increasing 
prominence in the capital network. On the other hand, 
despite declining centrality score, the hegemon in the
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Table 4. Predominant Changes in Capital Network 
Centrality, 1970-1978
1970 1978
---------    Percent Change
Centrality 
Nation Score Rank
Declining Dominance
United Kingdom 7.985 1
Switzerland 1.866 5
Australia 1.024 8
Italy .747 9
Canada .646 11
Lebanon .263 19
United Arab Emirates .247 20
BraziI .226 21
Indonesia .202 23
Portugal .150 25
Iran .133 27
Romani a .125 29
Iceland .077 36
icreasing Dominance
United States 3.723 2
France 1.923 4
Japan 1.303 7
Kuwait .729 10
Netherlands .464 13
Hong Kong .450 14
Sweden .380 16
Finland .266 18
Bahrain .216 22
Denmark .181 24
Malaysia .145 26
Singapore .122 30
Greece .121 31
Algeria .114 32
Iraq .113 33
Spain .055 47
Centrality in
Score Rank Centrality Score
6.900 1 -13.59
.743 12 -60.20
.850 10 -16.97
.614 14 -17.87
.449 16 -30.42
.077 41 -70.62
.180 27 -27.19
.165 28 -26.76
.097 36 -52.03
.059 47 -60.52
.055 48 -58.97
.078 40 -36.98
.060 46 -22.36
4.107 2 10.31
3.231 3 67.96
1.419 7 8.90
1.067 9 46.24
1.694 5 264.64
1.515 6 236.94
.511 15 34.61
.398 18 49.67
.758 11 250.86
.419 17 131.27
.198 25 36.77
.257 23 110.11
.201 24 66.54
.278 21 144.32
.273 22 142.34
.114 33 106.22
capital network, United Kingdom, still strove to hold the 
top rank. The result may correspond to Wallerstein's (1984) 
assumption on three stages of a hegemony: the initial 
competitive advantage in the provision of production will 
be replaced by capital investment, and eventually the 
export of financial services will perform the core function 
for the world-economy. This is because the centrality in 
financial services exchange that developed following 
earlier centrality in production is an important resource 
for the national economy and for the functioning of the 
larger world economy.
Table 5 presents the labor network centrality score 
and rank for 1970 and 197 8 and the percent change in 
centrality score between these years. The most noticeable 
change in the formation of international labor network is 
the increase of the number of dominant countries from 14 to 
17. Unlike trade and capital network, the shift of 
prominence in the labor flows are much more profound.
Nearly half of the dominant countries experienced more than 
10 percent decrease in their labor centralities.
Conversely, countries experienced increasing centrality in 
the labor network are virtually from the subdominant or 
lower order tiers of the hierarchy, with the exception of 
Netherlands which is considered to be one of the dominant 
countries. From the world-system perspective, there is a 
clear shift in dominance of labor centrality in terms of
Table 5. Predominant Changes in Labor Network 
Centrality, 1970-1978
Nation
1970 1978
Percent Change 
in
Centrality Score
Centrality 
Score Rank
Centrality 
Score Rank
Declining Dominance
United States 6.025 1 5.467 1 -9.27
German Fed. Rep. 2.960 2 2.629 2 -11.19
Italy 2.838 3 2.120 6 -25.31
Canada 1.892 8 1.534 10 -18.91
Poland 1.629 9 .989 18 -39.30
Spain 1.352 11 1.167 14 -13.69
Argentina 1.071 14 .929 20 -13.21
Japan .719 19 .506 34 -29.61
Ghana .716 21 .379 40 -47.07
Switzerland .625 23 .517 32 -17.21
Malaysia .566 26 .067 69 -88.23
Hungary .459 32 .206 54 -55.15
Saudi Arabia .436 34 .307 44 -29.72
Thai land .317 41 .141 58 -55.41
Macau .224 46 .093 67 -58.44
Bahamas, The .116 60 .001 80 -99.31
Increasing Dominance
China 1.514 10 2.443 4 61.38
USSR 1.261 13 1.885 9 49.57
Mexico .806 18 1.187 13 47.40
Venezuela .703 22 .932 19 32.66
Chechoslovakia .565 27 1.418 11 150.82
Netherlands .477 30 .548 29 14.81
Nigeria .464 31 .781 22 68.28
Korea .423 36 1.087 15 156.97
New Zealand .243 44 .328 41 34.86
Egypt .219 47 .528 30 140.78
Philippines .200 50 .309 43 54.70
L i bya .143 55 .290 45 102.59
Mali .112 61 .276 47 145.76
Indonesia .079 66 .507 33 538.37
Costa Rica .077 67 .225 51 193.23
United Arab Emirates .011 74 .177 57 1554.86
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core/periphery hierarchy. The result may reflect Lubeck and 
Palmer's (1990) assertion that most peripheral countries' 
ethnic identities and roles in the division of labor were 
shaped by the era of formal colonialism. By 1970, the end 
of imperialism followed by the increase of multinational 
corporations has further intensified the movement of labor 
between countries. Hence, we can expect an continuing 
redistribution of population and labor in the process of 
international ethnic division of labor.
Mobility - The Vertical Dimension
As seen in Tables 3, 4, and 5, the international 
production network is a complex system with an multilevel 
hierarchy. Table six through ten were constructed to 
further display the dynamics of vertical mobility within 
each transactional network for different time periods.
It is clear that the relatively small size and 
corresponding component of dominant country within the 
trade network remained virtually unchanged during all three 
time periods. In other words, the phenomenon of domination 
by a small number of countries is in somewhat stable but 
shifting alliances. Historically, the new phase of world 
trade has started since the end of the Second World War, 
dominated by the hegemony of the United States (Baran and 
Sweezy 1966; Sunkel 1973). This internationalization 
process renewed the growth of world trade within nearly all
Table 6. Mobility Within Trade Network by Levels of
Centrality: 1970-1978
1978
77
>1 . 0 .30-1.0
1970
Level of Centrality 
.15-.29 .08-.14 .03-.07 <.03
Centrality
> 1.0
US
German F.R. 
UK
Japan
France
Italy
Netherlands
Canada
Belgium Saudi Arabia
Centrality
.30-1.0
Sweden
Switzerland
Finland
USSR
Australia
Denmark
Spain
Austria Iran
Norway Venezuela
Hong Kong South Korea
BraziI Taiwan
Romani a Singapore
Yugoslavia Indonesia Nigeria
Centrali ty 
.15-.29
South Africa China
Malaysia
Kuwait
Poland
Argentina
Greece
Libya
Mexico
Ireland
India
Algeria
Iraq
Thai land 
Turkey Morocco
Portugal Philippines
New Zealand Egypt
Centrality Czechoslovakia German D.R.
.08-.14 Chi le Israel Cote d'Ivoire
Hungary Bahamas
Colombia Syria
Panama
Pakistan
Peru
Zambia
Centrality 
.03-.07
Bulgaria
Lebanon
Ghana
Costa Rica
Kenya
Sri Lanka
Cuba
Bahrain
Jamaica
Ecuador
Tunisia
Angola Cameroon
Tanzania Honduras
Macau Liberia
Centrality
<.03
Uruguay Iceland
Cyprus
Congo
Bangladesh
Note: Closeness Measure ($=.8) is used for the classification of levels of centrality.
Table 7. Mobility Within Trade Network by Levels of 78
Centrality: 1978-1990
1990 >1.0 .30-1.0
1978
Level of Centrality 
.15-.29 .08-.14 .07-.03 <.03
Centrali ty 
>1.0
US
German F.R. 
Japan 
France 
UK
Italy
Netherlands
Canada
Belgium
Centrality
.30-1.0
Saudi Arabia Sweden
Switzerland
USSR
Spain
Australia
BraziI
Austria
Denmark
Hong Kong
Norway
South Korea
Taiwan
Singapore
Finland
China 
Mexico 
Malaysia 
Thai land
Centrality 
.15-.29
Iran
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Indonesia
India
Ireland
Turkey
Poland
Greece
South Africa
Portugal
Czechoslovakia
Centrality 
.08-.14
Nigeria
Romania
Algeria
Argentina
Iraq
Libya
Philippines
Egypt
New Zealand 
Israel 
Hungary 
Chi le 
Colombia Pakistan
Centrality 
.03-.07
German D.R. 
Tunisia 
Syria 
Kuwait
Tunisia
Kenya
Peru
Bahrain
Bulgaria
Ecuador
Sri Lanka
Panama
Liberia
Bangladesh
Angola
Centrality
<.03
Morocco Cuba
Lebanon
Zambi a
Costa Rica
Bahamas
Jamaica
Ghana
Cyprus
Uruguay
Cameroon
Mauritius
Macau
Malta
Iceland
Congo
Tazania
Honduras
Mali
Malawi
Rwanda
Note: Closeness Measure ($=.8) is used for the classification of levels of centrality.
Table 8. Mobility Within Trade Network by Levels of
Centrality: 1970-1990
1990 >1.0 .30-1.0
1970
.Level of Centrality 
.15-.29 .08-.14 .03-.07 <.03
Centrality
>1.0
US
German F.R. 
UK
Japan
France
Italy
Netherlands
Canada
Belgium
Centrality 
.30-1.0
Sweden
Switzerland
Finland
USSR
Australia
Denmark
Spain
Austria
Norway
Hong Kong
BraziI
China
South Korea
Taiwan
Singapore
Saudi Arabia
Mexico
Malaysia Thai land
Centrality 
.15-.29
South Africa 
Yugoslavia
India
Indonesia
Portugal
Ireland
Iran
Greece
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Venezuela Turkey
Centrality 
.08-.14
Romania Argentina 
New Zealand 
Libya 
Chi le 
Algeria
Israel
Hungary
Nigeria
Philippines
Iraq
Egypt
Pakistan
Colombia
Centrality 
.03-.07
Kuwait German D.R.
Peru
Panama
Morocco
Tunisia
Syria
Kenya
Cote d'Ivoi re 
Bahrain 
Bulgaria 
Ecuador 
Sri Lanka Bangladesh
Centrality
<.03
Zambi a Cuba
Lebanon
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Bahamas
Dominican R.
Jamaica
Macau
Ghana
Tazania
Cyprus
Cameroon
Mauritius
Malta
Iceland
Congo
Honduras
Mali
Malawi
Barbados
Rwanda
Note: Closeness Measure (jS=.8) is used for the classification of levels of centrality.
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economic sectors (including the private service sectors). 
Meanwhile, the rise of transactional corporations (TNCs) 
distinguished by direct investments abroad in a wide range 
of industries marks another new feature (Vernon 1971; 1977; 
Barnet and Muller 1974). Moreover, a variety of political 
and technological factors facilitated the international 
expansion of trade in the postwar era. Beginning in the 
1970s, the hegemony of the United States began to show 
signs of weakening (Amin, Arrighi, Frank, and Wallerstein 
1982; Weber 1983; Bousquet 1980). Combined with increased 
protectionism employed by advanced countries in an attempt 
to cope with the rapid growth of manufactured exports from 
the newly industrialized countries (Yoffie 1983), a 
competitive condition emerged as dominant nations seek to 
increase their shares of the world market.
Table 9 shows that capital network has a comparable 
small size of dominant countries. However, in the highest 
tier of the hierarchy, their positions are relatively 
insecure. Two countries (Australia and Switzerland) show 
downward mobility, and three countries (Hong Kong, 
Netherlands, and Kuwait) move up from one tier below.
Unlike trade network, capital flows are more sensitive to 
the regulation of markets. The international monetary 
system became much more unstable after the United States 
decided to abandon the gold standard in 1971 (Block 1977). 
The deregulation of European and Japanese financial markets
Table 9. Mobility Within Capital Network by Levels of
Centrality: 1970-1978
1978 >1.0 .25-1.0
19 70
Level of Centrality 
.10-.24 .05-.09 <■05
Centrality
>1.0
UK
US
Belgium 
France 
German F.R. 
Japan
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Kuwait
Centrality
.25-1.0
Australia
Switzerland
Italy
Canada
Egypt
Norway
Sweden
Saudi Arabia
Finland
Bahrain
Denmark
Algeria
Iraq
Singapore
Centrality 
.10-.24
UAE
Brazil
Malaysia
Austria
Greece
L i bya
Mexico
Syria
New Zealand 
Spain Korea
Centrality 
.06-.09
Lebanon Indonesia
Portugal
Iran
Romania
Thailand
Iceland 
Colombia 
Morocco 
Philippines 
Venezuela
South Africa Malta Liberia
Tunisia Rwanda Costa Rica
Yugoslavia Bulgaria Mali
Barbados Turkey
Ireland Kenya
Chi le Cyprus
India Pakistan
Czechoslovakia Bangladesh
Centrality Hungary Poland
<■05 Sri Lanka Uruguay
Jamaica Malawi
Honduras Argentina
Cameroon Nigeria
Congo Ecuador
Panama Israel
Ghana Peru
Cote d'Ivoire Mauritius
Tazania Dominican R.
China Zambi a
Bahamas
Note: Closeness Measure is used for the classification of levels of centrality.
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in the mid-1970s further led to an increase globalization 
of the capital market (Mizruchi and Stearns 1994) . 
Additionally, the transition of domination occurred as 
Gerschenkron (1962) argued that credit-based systems, such 
as France, Germany, and Japan, are solutions to late 
development while the capital market-based systems, such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom, are tied to an 
earlier industrial transformation. Credit-based systems 
differ to the degree that the banks themselves are 
dependent on the government for funds.
Table 10 presents mobility within labor network by 
levels of centrality. During 1970-1978, seven out of 
thirteen countries in the top level experienced decreasing 
centrality in the labor network, within which Spain and 
Poland further descended to the next tier. Besides, another 
five advanced economies including the United States, West 
Germany, Italy, France, and Canada, were all experiencing 
downfalls in labor centrality. This result may correspond 
to the argument that the patterns of migration flows were 
determined by uneven development, that is, by the 
increasingly divergent rates of economic growth in 
different sectors of the world-economy (Davis 1974; Thomas 
1954) . Moreover, the growing interdependence at the 
international level may spur increasing labor movements. 
However, the issue of ethnic enclaves also plays a pivotal 
part in the processes of integration into the global
Table 10. Mobility Within Labor Network by Levels of
Centrality: 1970-1978
1970
Level of Centrality
1978 >1.2 .50-1.2 .30-.54 .20-.29 .08-.19 <.08
Centrality
>1.2
US
German F.R.
Italy
UK
India
Pakistan
France
Canada
China
Turkey
USSR Czechoslovakia
Centrality
.55-1.2
Spain
Poland
Argentina
Mexico
Portugal
Australia
Venezuela
Brazil
Yugoslavia
Greece
South Africa
Sweden
Switzerland
Nigeria
Colombia
Netherlands
Korea
Centrality 
.30-.54
Japan
Malawi
Ghana
Belgium
Saudi Arabia
Cuba
Kenya
Tazania
Rwanda
Egypt
Philippines 
New Zealand Indonesia
Centrality 
.20-.29
Hungary Zambi a
Morocco
Israel
Finland
Austria
Libya 
Chi le 
Mali Costa Rica
Centrality 
.08-.19
Thai land Macau
Honduras
Ireland
Denmark
Congo
Sri Lanka
Bulgaria
Liberia
Tunisia
Bangladesh
Iraq
UAE
Lebanon
Centrality
<.08
Mauritius
Bahamas
German D.R.
Ecuador
Panama
Romania
Peru
Malta
Iceland
Kuwait
Cyprus
Note: Closeness Measure (;8=.8) is used for the classification of levels of centrality.
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division of labor (Bonacich 1973); namely, the articulation 
of internal and external (national and global) labor flows. 
As Enloe (1980) suggests, both the state and any given 
ethnic group must be seen as dynamic, as historical.
By and large, changes of dominant positions in these 
production networks over the 20-year period is gradual and 
moderate. As Chase-Dunn contends,
"Core states do not decline absolutely. The entire 
world-economy continues to grow, albeit at different 
rates. What happens is that core states relatively lose 
their hegemony, but they do not plunge into the 
periphery. The most important cause of relative decline 
is the spread of leading core industries to other 
competing core countries, and to parts of the 
semiperiphery." (Chase-Dunn 1989, p.175).
The most significant and consistent change across 
trade, capital, and labor networks is the extensive 
movements of positions in the subdominant level. While a 
few countries in the lower order level achieved certain 
degree of upward mobility, the number of countries that 
experienced downward mobility is just as frequent, or even 
higher. The phenomenon can be manifested by trade network 
from 1970-1990 (table 8), the ratio of upward to downward 
mobility is drastically dropped from 8 to 3 for subdominant 
countries, to 1:6, 0:4, and 2:10 for tier 2 through 5, 
respectively.
This pattern of extensive upward mobility for 
subdominant countries is analogous to that of 
semiperipheral nations as asserted by world-system
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theorists. However, the autonomous role each country has 
played in the global networks is ignored. Instead, studies 
of the world system offer explanations primarily based on 
the conception of the "new international division of 
labor." It is claimed that leaving one structural position 
implies taking on a new role in the international division 
of labor, rather than escaping from the system. Namely, 
change of status in the economic hierarchy is at best a 
result of "development by invitation" or "dependent 
development." (Martin 1990). Nonetheless, a number of 
theorists have become more skeptical to the literature as 
the international economy has entered a new phase of 
"global capitalism" (Ross and Trachte 1990). Gereffi (1994) 
contends that it is outdated to assert that as the 
international division of labor widened, the economic 
functions of states became increasingly divided between 
those specializing in diversified manufacturing at one 
pole, and those specializing in the production of primary 
products for export at the other.
Another common explanation suggested by world-system 
analysts is the phenomenon of capital flight and the 
accompanied result of deindustrialization within the core. 
It also has been frequently cited in the contemporary 
United States as an explanation for the migration of 
capital from the Northeast to the Sunbelt, and out of the 
country altogether (Goldfrank 1983). However, Abowd and
Freeman (1991) suggest that industrialization has been 
replaced as the basis of core activities by the growing 
importance of vertically integrated transactional 
corporations (TNCs) in all branches of economic activity 
(from agriculture and mining to manufacturing, 
distribution, and banking). Hence, the increasing 
interaction between nations and TNCs has served to dissolve 
and blur any previously existing correlation between the 
core-periphery dichotomy and dichotomies based on the 
specific kind of commodities produced (e.g. manufacturing 
vs. agriculture) or even on the techniques of production 
used (e.g. high productivity vs low productivity).
Current studies (e.g. Evans and Stephens 1988; Gereffi 
1994) suggest that we need to disaggregate roles of 
semiperipheral nations and focus on the specific features 
of the NICs in different geographical regions. Many studies 
have examined countries located within the semiperipheral 
zone, such as South Korea and Taiwan in East Asia, Mexico 
and Brazil in Latin American, India and South Asia, and 
Nigeria and South Africa in Africa (Biersteker 1987; 
Bradshaw 1988; Encarnation 1989; Evans 197 9; Gold 1981; Lim 
1985; Moran 1974). However, most of them merely provide an 
ad-hoc rationalizations of policy directions, or are 
limited in their ability to analyze concrete development 
trajectories of countries and regions that are similarly
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situated, but responds differently to external economic 
challenges.
The present analysis shows consistently that the rise 
and decline of each country or region within the multiple- 
network hierarchy results from their degree of involvement 
into the global economy. Additionally, position in these 
transactional networks determines the role of national 
economies within each international economic activity. It 
is still debatable if the upward movements of countries in 
the subdominant and lower order level lead to 
possibilities for autonomous paths of development or simply 
result in another form of dependence. Nevertheless, the 
consequences of nonincorporation or marginalization in the 
global economy, such as sub-Saharan Africa, may cause the 
severest problems of all.
Declining Network Centralization
In the past decade, considerable attention has been 
given to the emphasis of a new trend of a regioncentric 
production network and the uniqueness of regional trading 
blocs within the world economy (Hansen et al. 1990; Kiel 
and Howard 1988). However, discussions in the previous 
sections have shown that the world economy is indeed 
hierarchically organized, with a few advanced countries 
dominating the multiple networks of production. Stated 
differently, this new pattern of geographical
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specialization in production networks still remain 
incorporated into the global transactional system.
Whereas the dominant countries still maintain 
extensive production relations with each of the other major 
regions, the formation and pattern of domination may have 
undergone significant changes. The trend of transformation 
may be from superimperialism to ultraimperialism within the 
dominant countries (Goldfrank 1983), as well as 
polarization to multilateralization of regional trading 
blocs (Gereffi 1994). Table 11 through 13 presents the 
Freeman statistics for centralization of the trade, 
capital, and labor networks for the world economy as a 
whole and regions in 1970, 1978, and 1990 (trade network 
only). Regional centralization relative to world production 
networks and regional centralization relative to all 
countries within the same region are presented.
Simply stated, the measure of overall network 
centralization indicates the degree to which a network is 
dominated by a few countries. In global production 
networks, the statistic yields a value of 1.0 when one 
country mediates all exchanges within a network. When all 
countries have equal centrality, namely no country 
dominates exchanges, the Freeman statistic is zero. As seen 
in Table 11, the overall level of centralization in the 
trade hierarchy declined from .61 to .55 between 1970 and 
197 8. Hence, the domination of network hierarchy by one
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power or few countries such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, is giving way to a pattern of competitive 
interdependence.
Results of overall centralization in capital and labor 
networks are consistent with that of trade network. Capital 
network has experienced dramatic declines in 
centralization, from .85 to .72 (Table 12). The degree to 
which the hierarchy of labor network was dominated by a few 
countries also decreased from .61 to .54 between 197 0 and 
1978 (Table 13). In general, disparities among countries in 
levels of centrality were significantly lessened over the 
past two decades. There has emerged a more decentralized 
exchange structure among countries within the system as a 
whole.
A region's prominence within the world economy weakens 
as the centrality of its dominant country declines.
Although North and Latin American and Western Europe 
continued to retain shifting dominance among three 
production networks, these regions' centrality within the 
world system and region have started to decline. On the 
other hand, Asian Pacific and South Asia has achieved 
remarkable increases in centrality scores across all 
transactional networks. Japan's outstanding performance in 
the global economy has contributed to this region's 
prominence within the world system and also accounted for 
the rise in centralization within Asian Pacific and South
Table 11. Level of Centralization in Trade Network:
the world and Regions, 1970, 1978, and 1990.
Level of Centralization
Within the World8 Within Regionsb Number
Region 1970 1978 1990 1970 1978 1990 of Cases
the World System .61 .55 .55 -- -- -- 93
North and Latin America .61 .55 .55 1.39 1.25 1.28 19
Western Europe .39 .41 .43 .75 .80 .85 19
Asian Pacific/South Asia .26 .27 .30 .68 .70 .75 16
Eastern Europe .02 .03 .03 .15 .17 .19 11
Southwest Asia/North Africa .00 .07 .01 .04 .27 .12 11
Subsaharan Africa .00 .00 .00 .07 .09 .04 17
a Centralization relative to the entire world-system network. 
b Centralization relative to other countries within each region.
Table 12. Level of Centralization in Capital Network: 
_______  the world and Regions, 1970 and 1978.
Region
Level of Centralization
Within the World3 Within Regions'3 Number
1970 1978 1970 1978 of Cases
the World System .85 .72 -- -- 82
Western Europe .85 .72 1.69 1.41 19
North and Latin America .37 .41 .88 .98 17
Asian Pacific/South Asia .10 .12 .34 .37 12
Southwest Asia/North Africa .04 .07 .16 .25 10
Eastern Europe .00 .00 .03 .01 9
Subsaharan Africa .00 .00 .01 .00 15
3 Centralization relative to the entire world-system network.
6 Centralization relative to other countries within each region.
Table 13. Level of Centralization in Labor Network:
the world and Regions, 1970 and 1978.
Level of Centralization
Within the World3 Within Regions'3 Number
Region 1970 1978 1970 1978 of Cases
the World System .61 .54 -- -- 80
North and Latin America .61 .54 1.43 1.28 15
Western Europe .26 .22 .50 .43 18
Asian Pacific/South Asia .19 .20 .50 .49 13
Eastern Europe .11 .14 .36 .42 11
Southwest Asia/North Africa .00 .00 .11 .10 9
Subsaharan Africa .01 .01 .12 .12 14
a Centralization relative to the entire world-system network. 
c Centralization relative to other countries within each region.
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Asia. sub-Saharan Africa persisted in exhibiting the 
greatest disparities from the other regions due to its 
partial or uneven links to the global economy.
As yet, however, the cycle of competition among core 
nations has not resulted in a multicentered system - one 
with a well-defined multilevel hierarchy. Declining network 
centralization was expected to distribute dominance of the 
core nations throughout the countries in the subdominant 
regions. However, after further examining centrality scores 
of each region, the hypothesis was not supported. Only core 
countries within three regions (North and Latin America, 
Western Europe, and Asian Pacific and South Asia) have 
centrality scores greater than 1.00. The result indicates 
that while the degree to which a network is dominated by a 
few countries has decreased, no new center emerged in the 
world economy. Additionally, this trend of declines in 
trade network centralization is somewhat stagnated between 
1978 and 1990.
Effects of Direct and Indirect Interactions
Centrality measures also provide analogous concepts in 
contrasting predominant theories through their approaches 
to spatial structure and development. In economic base 
approaches, the volume of exportation of a place is the 
major concern (Thompson 1965). Thus, the overall structure 
of the production networks are not emphasized, limiting the
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scope of interaction to dyad. When centrality is determined 
by the number of direct contacts between pairs of points, 
degree centrality (|8=0) is the corresponding measure.
The political economy perspective, which drew heavily on 
Marxist beliefs of capitalist exploitation, is consistent 
with the concept of the competitive distance measure (/3=- 
.8). Briefly, interactions with central places decrease the 
dominance of a given country while connections with less 
central countries increase its centrality. On the other 
hand, the ecological view of centrality involves the 
relationship of places to the broader sociospatial network. 
Hence, frequency of contact with the larger system and the 
extensive scope of interaction are central to a country's 
dominance within the global hierarchy. Closeness-based 
centrality (/?=. 8), which stresses the importance of both 
direct and indirect contacts and takes the relative 
position of other places into consideration, is suitable to 
ecological conceptions of dominance and hierarchy.
Table 14 shows the compatibility between centrality 
measures (degree, competitive distance, and closeness) and 
development theories (economic base, political economy, and 
ecological), using centrality scores and ranks of trade 
network between 1970 and 1990. The table presents most 
countries located within the subdominant level of the 
economic hierarchy, a critical structural position to 
world-system theorists.
Table 14. Competitive Distance, Degree, and Closeness Measures of Centrality in 
Economic Base, Political Economy, and Ecological Theories: Using Trade 
Network Measures, 1970-1990
1970 1978 1990
Competitive Degree Closeness Competitive Degree Closeness Competitive Degree Closeness
0= -0.8 
Score Rank
0
Score Rank
0.
Score
8
Rank
-0.8
Score Rank
0
Score Rank
0.
Score
8
Rank
-0.8 
Score Rank
0
Score Rank
0.8
Score Rank
German F.R. 2.202 3 3.191 3 4.133 2 3.497 2 4.049 2 4.327 2 3.457 2 4.164 2 4.552 2
Japan 1.677 5 2.628 4 2.879 4 3.261 3 3.289 3 2.992 3 2.959 3 3.341 3 3.347 3
China .285 11 .306 17 .276 25 .239 24 .303 27 .277 34 .444 15 .675 12 .825 12
Switzerland .187 14 .465 12 .756 11 .357 17 .599 14 .752 12 .310 20 .589 14 .838 11
Belgium .162 19 .696 8 1.340 9 .391 15 .925 8 1.428 9 .662 10 1.029 7 1.377 8
Norway .101 30 .231 25 .385 18 .184 25 .327 26 .419 23 .390 17 .401 22 .379 25
Argentina .081 32 .176 30 .257 26 .273 20 .282 28 .228 40 .208 32 .190 39 .129 47
Venezuela .028 47 .122 37 .212 32 -.089 91 .421 19 .611 15 .219 28 .222 36 .157 40
Thai land .016 52 .075 47 .132 49 .078 37 .130 47 .158 46 .183 35 .272 27 .334 27
Korea -.002 66 .073 48 .151 45 -.011 85 .198 34 .372 25 .308 21 .564 16 .737 15
Algeria -.009 76 .072 49 .151 44 -.110 92 .090 54 .257 36 .048 63 .101 50 .140 42
Nigeria -.010 77 .061 60 .132 50 -.083 90 .196 35 .412 24 .148 40 .161 43 .137 44
South Africa -.014 81 .159 32 .330 21 .101 32 .229 31 .284 32 .191 34 .206 37 .186 38
Turkey -.017 82 .079 46 .147 47 .093 35 .131 46 .155 47 .182 36 .222 35 .226 34
Philippines -.038 84 .056 62 .150 46 .001 82 .081 58 .148 49 .052 62 .098 51 .132 45
Indonesia -.038 85 .063 59 .165 43 -.045 88 .161 38 .322 30 .076 51 .179 41 .278 30
Chi le -.043 86 .071 52 .171 41 .045 46 .078 61 .090 58 .084 47 .104 49 .103 51
Ireland -.050 87 .071 51 .167 42 -.002 84 .114 50 .188 44 .021 73 .139 64 .248 33
Mexico -.055 88 .068 53 .174 38 -.068 89 .101 52 .222 41 -.039 92 .231 34 .396 24
New Zealand -.076 90 .096 42 .233 29 .075 38 .119 48 .137 51 .068 55 .092 53 .114 48
Panama -.083 91 .030 70 .111 54 .037 50 .041 66 .033 73 .069 54 .056 64 .030 70
Finland -.305 92 .235 23 .655 12 .174 27 .249 29 .312 31 .153 39 .253 29 .328 28
Canada -.454 93 .654 9 1.426 8 -.574 93 .680 11 1.602 8 -.446 93 .627 13 1.365 9
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Turning first to negative levels of /3, and comparing 
the -.8 column for the period of 1970 and the -.8 column 
for 1978 and 1990, we can see that the competitive distance 
measure of position gives various results for all three 
time periods. New Zealand and Finland were both considered 
as developed countries, yet they were at the bottom of the 
hierarchy (90 and 92, respectively) in 1970, then moved 
drastically to the 38th and 27th rank in 1980, and 
eventually dropped to the 55th and 39th in 1990. Clearly, 
competitive distance measures have exaggerated the harmful 
effects of interactions with dominant countries.
Examining the column where /3=0, we see that the 
degree-based conception of centrality better abridges rank 
differences for both time periods. Turning to the columns 
|3=. 8 we can see that the two levels of /? give similar 
results. The higher level of f3 (.8) takes into account 
direct as well as indirect interactions in calculating 
closeness centrality. Moreover, the beneficial effects from 
extensive contacts, directly and indirectly, can be better 
pictured by the rise of countries which are usually cited 
as examples of "dependent development" in the subdominant 
level (e.g. South Korea and Thailand).
Nevertheless, competitive distance measures may have 
provided one distinctive feature to distinguish countries 
which are most likely to remain in the subdominant or lower 
levels. This feature which disadvantages upward mobility is
the lack of extensive trading partners. Canada, Mexico, and 
Ireland are the best examples. They all have limited and 
concentrated interactions with neighboring dominant 
countries, namely the United States and European Community 
countries. Lacking an extensive scope of transactional 
interactions is the major reason to classify Canada and 
Ireland as the "perimeter of the core" (cf. Grant and Lyons 
1990; Niosi 1990).
CHAPTER SIX
EFFECTS OF TRANSACTIONAL NETWORKS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
To assess the importance of linkages to the global 
transactional networks as a competitive factor affecting a 
country's economic growth, a multiple regression analysis 
is employed. The analysis introduced alternative variables 
which have been hypothesized to be determinants of economic 
growth in the world system. To assure the effects and 
measures to be more robust and appropriate for cross­
national comparisons, all the estimates are based on 
difference-of-logs models. Moreover, the analysis was 
extended to two specific groups of nations: centrally 
planned economies and oil exporting countries. Contrasts 
were also made among different measure of the dependent 
variable, namely GNP per capita, PQLI, and HDI. Finally, a 
reduced-form model was utilized to evaluate the performance 
of network measures, net of controlling variables, on 
stimulating economic growth.
Results of Difference-of-Logs Models
Tables 15 and 16 report the estimated effects of key 
theoretical and control variables on change in a nation's 
economic growth between 1970 and 1978, and 1978 and 1990, 
respectively. Three different levels of parameters, .8,
0, and -.8, are applied to centrality measures in
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Table 15. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth 1970-1978 on 
Selected Independent Variables, by Network Measures
Independent Variable
Network Measures 
Closeness Degree Competitive 
<0=.8>* (0=0) (0=-
Distance
.8)
b Beta b Beta b Beta
Economies
OEC .228** .367 .252*** .406 .383*** .478
(. 078) (.074) (.307)
CPE . 118* . 190 .141** . 227 .131** .211
(. 065) (.066) ( .063)
All other countries contrast contrast contrast
Growth Rates
Trade centrality .152* .223 .164** . 248 5.237*** .292
( 085) (.080) (1.818)
Capital centrality .049 . 050 . 040 . 041 - . 185 - . 022
(.108) (.101) (.879)
Labor centrality .004 . 007 -.003 . 007 -1.477 - . 130
(.059) (.052) (1.312)
Capital penetration -.321 - .161 -.312 . 157 -.356 - .179
(.231) (.228) ( .220)
Primary export .112 .149 . 116 . 155 . 107 . 142
dependence ( 096) (.095) ( .095)
Export intensity 086 - . 142 -.086 . 141 - . 069 - . 114
( 065) (.064) (.062)
Labor intensity .295 .110 . 356 . 133 .383 . 143
(.329) (.312) ( .307)
Capital intensity 167 . 101 . 100 . 061 .275 .167
( 222) (.228) ( .209)
Defense expenditure 071 . 104 . 053 . 077 . 053 . 077
( 073) (.073) (.070)
Human capital 041 . 028 . 041 . 028 . 100 .068
investment ( 179) (.178) ( .169)
Control Effects
1970 GNP per capita .114** .343 .118** . 353 .110*** .330
(.052) (.051) ( .049)
Largest variance
inflation factor 2 .192 2.355 2.339
R2 .425 .432 .469
Adjusted R2 .296 .305 . 351
Number of cases 72 72 72
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
#j8 parameters refer to centrality measures.
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting 
Countries, respectively, b = unstandardized regression 
coefficient with standard error in parenthesis; Beta = 
standardized regression coefficient.
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Table 16. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth 1978-1990 on 
Selected Independent Variables, by Network Measures
Independent Variable
Network Measures 
Closeness Degree Competitive 
(0=.8)" (0=0) (0=-
Distance
.8)
b Beta b Beta b Beta
Economies
OEC -.255*** - . 368 - .357***- . 517 - . 376*** - . 544
( .066) (.070) (.075)
CPE . 040 . 058 . 044 . 064 . 055 . 079
( .059) ( .067) (.071)
All other countries contrast contrast contrast
Growth Rates
Trade centrality . 374*** .481 .193*** . 273 . 028 . 008
(.072) (.070) (3.539)
Capital penetration . 225 . 058 .124 . 032 . 019 . 005
( .382) ( .432) ( .456)
Primary export - . 001 - . 001 -.030 . 032 - . 079 - . 083
dependence ( .086) ( . 097) (.105)
Export intensity - . 128 - . 142 -.076 . 084 - . 041 - . 045
( .092) ( .103) (.110)
Labor intensity - . 103 - . 082 -.121 . 096 - . 120 - . 095
(.111) ( .126) (.134)
Capital intensity .184 . 102 .253 . 140 . 246 . 136
( .172) ( .194) ( .207)
Defense expenditure - . 070 - . 086 -.037 . 046 - . 027 - . 034
(.068) ( .076) (.081)
Human capital .264* . 150 .242 . 137 . 198 . 112
investment (.158) ( .179) (.191)
Control Effects
1970 GNP per capita .165*** .492 .lgg*** . 594 . 170*** .507
(.030) (.036) (.036)
Largest variance
inflation factor 1. 722 1.691 1. 691
R2 .638 .536 .477
Adjusted R2 . 572 .450 .381
Number of cases 72 72 72
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
"0 parameters refer to centrality measures.
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting 
Countries, respectively, b = unstandardized regression 
coefficient with standard error in parenthesis; Beta = 
standardized regression coefficient.
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Table 17. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth 1970-1990 on 
Selected Independent Variables, by Network Measures
Independent Variable
Network Measures 
Closeness Degree Competitive 
(j8=.8)» (0=0) (0=-
Distance
.8)
b Beta b Beta b Beta
Economies
OEC - .063 - . 067 -.086 . 090 - . 074 - . 078
(.094) (.102) (.103)
CPE . 163* .171 .214** .225 . 198* .208
(.094) ( .104) (.104)
All other countries contrast contrast contrast
Growth Rates
Trade centrality .406*** .440 .233** .292 6 .668** . 238
(.094) (.092) (2.874)
Capital penetration -.449* - . 174 -.505* -.196 -.521* - .202
(.251) (.273) (.275)
Primary export .106 . 126 . 117 .139 .103 . 121
dependence ( .099) ( .107) (.108)
Export intensity - .126* - . 188 -.101 .151 - . 073 - . 110
( .067) (.074) (.074)
Labor intensity . 033 . 021 . 063 . 040 .176 .112
(.183) ( .201) ( .197)
Capital intensity .345 . 196 .472* .269 .595** .338
(.242) ( .260) ( .260)
Defense expenditure - . 036 - . 041 -.096 . 110 - . 123 - . 141
( . 099) (.106) (.106)
Human capital . 025 . 015 -.019 . 011 - . 090 - . 053
investment ( .200) (.218) (.218)
Control Effects
197 0 GNP per capita .299*** . 585 .345*** .675 .295*** . 579
( . 069) (.076) (.076)
Largest variance
inflation factor 2 .267 2.263 2.188
R2 .499 .406 .397
Adjusted R2 .407 .297 .286
Number of cases 72 72 72
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
#/8 parameters refer to centrality measures.
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting 
Countries, respectively, b = unstandardized regression 
coefficient with standard error in parenthesis; Beta = 
standardized regression coefficient.
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reflecting competitive theoretical perspectives, i.e., 
ecological, economic-base, and political economy.
A nation's position in trade centrality presents 
significant positive effects on economic growth for two 
consecutive time periods. Among the hypothesized 
alternative variables, however, significant positive 
effects were found only for investment in education, and 
weak or nonexistent effects were found for dependence and 
industrialization variables, as well as defense 
expenditure. Moreover, the effects of trade centrality on 
economic growth has gained more significance in the period 
between 1978 and 1990 than the previous period 1970-1978, 
the interval typical of dependency studies. The overall 
explanatory power of the predictor variables for economic 
growth in equations using closeness measures for network 
variables are superior to those of degree and competitive 
distance measures. The differences of R2 in the second 
period are remarkable - the adjusted R? indicated that 
equations using closeness measures explained nearly 20 
percent (.572-.381) more of the variance. The result 
depicts the increasing positive effects of indirect 
transactional interactions in accounting for growth in the 
global economy.
Table 17 further examines the effects of independent 
variables on economic growth for the pool years, i.e., 
1970-1990. The coefficient for trade centrality maintains
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the most significant predictor variable for economic 
growth. In addition, three alternatively hypothesized 
variables - capital penetration, export intensity, and 
capital intensity attain statistical significance. Another 
analogous finding is the disappearance of significant 
effect for economic growth when contrasting oil-exporting 
countries to all other countries. This is not surprising, 
considering all these variables are highly sensitive to 
relative prices changes, especially during the 1970s. For 
example, during the 197 0s the total income of Saudi Arabia 
increased much more rapidly than its total output, due to 
changes in the price of oil relative to other goods 
(Firebaugh 1983). For this reason, further examination of 
the subsamples will be discussed in the following section.
Concerning the reliability of the results, special 
attentions is paid to some measurement problems. First of 
all, each equation uses logged variables (the difference- 
of-logs model) to lessen the vulnerabilities of results to 
high levels of skewness. In this logged form, all the 
regressors have lower levels of skewness compared to their 
original metric forms. Most of the regressors have skewness 
levels lower than or close to 1, with the exception of 
capital centrality when calculated using -.8 and 0 (3 
parameter. Thus, these measures are eliminated from 
subsequent analysis. Since unstable levels of skewness may 
correlate with problems of outliers and inhibit the
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usefulness of results, the possibility for outliers are 
screened using DFBETA statistic.13 The possibility of 
multicollinearity is also considered, given the 
considerable zero-order correlations among some of the 
independent variables (see Appendix A and B). As a rule of 
thumb, to safeguard against multicollinearity problems, the 
largest variance inflation factor (VIF) cannot go beyond a 
value of 4. The largest VIF in the analysis is 2.468 
throughout all models, suggesting rather weak dependence 
among the independent variables.14
The initial levels of GNP per capita is also included 
to test if the effects of network centralities have 
substantive meanings on economic growth. Although Jackman 
(1980) suggests that the adoption of the growth-rate model 
eliminates the need for an adjustment by initial value, it 
is common to suspect the effects of scale economy 
(Firebaugh 1983). Hence, the initial level of GNP per
13The diagnostic checks for outliers identify 
Singapore and Dominican Republic as influential nations to 
the results. Equations are rerun omitting these countries. 
Although the influences are minimal and results are 
essentially the same with or without the outliers, these 
cases are excluded in avoidance of latent problems.
14Another way of detecting multicollinearity is 
established by computing a "condition index" which is the 
ratio of the largest eigenvalue extracted from a given X'X 
matrix to the eigenvalue for the given dependence.
Condition indices in the range of 5 to 10 are indicative of 
the existence of a weak dependence, while indices in excess 
of 30 are indicative of strong relations. All condition 
indices were all less than 5 in this analysis. Again, 
multicollinearity problem can be considered negligible.
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capita is controlled as a separate variable to fulfill the 
constant-effects assumption, and remove the effects of 
initial scores on subsequent gain. Results for the control 
variables are constant and the effects are statistically 
significant and positive as expected, reassuring the 
substantive interpretations on consistent effects of trade 
centralities. While wealthier countries continue to have 
higher rates of economic growth, increased transactional 
linkages with the international economy also foster 
significant positive instead of exploitative effects on 
a country's growth.
Economies and Growth
Since the period 1970-1978 was a peculiar interval for 
dependence studies, development theorists commonly place 
their focus of research exclusively on poor regions such as 
Third World countries and Latin America. Nonetheless, the 
effects of growing interdependence among countries on the 
global economy should be extensively studied across 
categories of countries or geographical regions.
Moreover, the present study also regards the uniqueness of 
centrally planned economies and oil exporting countries 
which experienced the most extreme changes from a period of 
global crisis precipitated by two oil price shocks in the 
1970s to the rise of the new international division of 
labor. According to Table 15, oil exporting countries (OEC)
105
and centrally planned economies (CPE) exhibit significant 
positive effects on economic growth compared to all other 
countries (the contrast group in the regression analysis) 
between 1970 and 1978. Oil exporting countries continued to 
have a significant, yet negative, association with economic 
growth in the period 1978-1990 (Table 16). For this reason, 
the analysis now turns to these two specific groups of 
countries.
In the following analysis, capital and labor 
centralities are omitted from the regression models due in 
part to their weak performances and also for the 
consistency of variable compositions in two time periods. 
Table 18 shows that the exclusion of centrally planned 
countries from the sample slightly improved the model's 
ability in explaining the variance - the R2 increased from 
.207 to .224. However, the directions of effect and signs 
of significance of the predictor variables remained 
essentially the same with or without CPE.
Conversely, oil-exporting countries exerted 
considerable influence on regression coefficients for 
economic growth between 1970-1978. After omitting OEC from 
the sample, the initial significant positive effect of 
trade centrality for economic growth was explained away by 
two of the dependence variables: capital penetration and 
export intensity. One of the reasons is that the rapidly 
growing rate of OEC's national account during this period
Table 18. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth 1970-1978 on Selected Independent Variables,
by Models of Economies
Independent Variable
All
Economies
CPE
Excluded
OEC
Excluded
CPE and OEC 
Excluded
b Beta b Beta b Beta b Beta
Growth Rates
Trade centrality .237*** .348 .226*** .343 .111 . 175 . 094 .158
(0=.8) (.083) (.083) (.082) (.078)
Capital penetration - .211 - . 106 - .201 -.105 -.391* - .233 -.392* - .251
(.238) (.237) (.220) (.209)
Primary export . 039 . 052 . 006 . 008 . 030 . 041 -.017 - . 025
dependence ( .094) (.094) ( .096) (.093)
Export intensity -.118* - . 194 -.119* - .200 -.131** - .261 -.139** - .292
(.067) (.068) (.061) (.060)
Labor intensity .154 . 058 .097 .037 .230 .130 .239 . Ill
(.333) (.334) (.321) (.308)
Capital intensity .284 . 173 .265 .167 .080 .056 . 052 .039
(.230) ( .231) ( .209) ( .200)
Defense expenditure .106 .154 .100 . 146 .089 . 155 . 099 . 177
(.075) (.078) ( .070) ( . 070)
Human capital . 164 . Ill .232 .152 -.082 - . 061 -.056 - . 041
investment (.184) (.192) ( .177) (.180)
Control Effects
1970 GNP per capita .138** .415 .150*** .457 .120** .421 .137*** .503
(.052) (.053) ( .048) (.047)
Largest variance
inflation factor 2.210 2.184 2 .228 2 .214
R2 .308 . 332 .278 .325
Adjusted R2 .207 . 224 .162 .203
Number of cases 72 66 66 60
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting Countries, respectively, 
b = unstandardized regression coefficient with standard error in parenthesis,- 
Beta = standardized regression coefficient.
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Table 19. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth 1978-1990 on Selected Independent Variables,
by Models of Economies
Independent Variable
All
Economies
CPE
Excluded
OEC
Excluded
CPE and OEC 
Excluded
b Beta b Beta b Beta b Beta
Growth Rates
Trade centrality .478*** .614 . 541*** .658 . 342*** .450 .407*** .500
(jS=.8) (.075) (.079) (.076) (.081)
Capital penetration . 086 . 022 .229 . 059 .249 . 073 .489 .142
( .420) ( .434) ( .409) (.422)
Primary export - .065 - .068 - . 063 - . 065 - . 068 - .058 - . 080 -.066
dependence ( .092) (.092) ( .127) ( .129)
Export intensity -.137 - . 151 - .159 - .164 - .105 - .129 - .176 -.200
(.101) (.111) ( .099) (.109)
Labor intensity - .116 - . 092 - .194 - .150 - .096 - . 089 - .176 - .160
(.122) ( -125) (.118) (.122)
Capital intensity .127 . 07 0 . 074 . 037 . 078 . 049 -.003 - . 002
(.180) ( .200) (.172) (.189)
Defense expenditure - . 025 - . 031 - . 038 - . 046 -.076 - . 102 - .115 - .150
(.074) ( .076) (.073) (.075)
Human capital .101 .057 .278 .143 .189 .119 .432** .245
investment (.167) (.191) (.162) (.188)
Control Effects
1970 GNP per capita .141** .417 .143*** .421 .158*** .532 .160*** .533
(.032) (.033) (.032) (.033)
Largest variance
inflation factor 1.702 1 . 813 1.753 1. 878
R2 . 544 .593 .528 .588
Adjusted R2 .478 .528 .452 .515
Number of cases 72 66 66 60
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting Countries, respectively, 
b = unstandardized regression coefficient with standard error in parenthesis;
Beta = standardized regression coefficient.
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Table 20. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth 1970-1990 on Selected Independent Variables,
by Models of Economies
Independent Variable
All
Economies
CPE
Excluded
OEC
Excluded
CPE and OEC 
Excluded
b Beta b Beta b Beta b Beta
Growth Rates
Trade centrality .417*** .451 . 474*** . 502 .337*** .369 .376*** .406
(jS=. 8) (.095) ( . 097) (.102) (.106)
Capital penetration - .436* - .169 - .423* - . 166 - .433 - . 177 -.413* - .171
(.254) (.247) (.250) (.243)
Primary export .136 .161 . 109 .129 . 037 . 032 -.012 -.010
dependence ( .098) (.097) ' ( .139) ( .140)
Export intensity -.117* - . 175 - .109 - .159 -.119* - . 182 -.114 - . 170
(.069) ( .069) (.068) (.068)
Labor intensity .086 . 055 - . 087 - . 055 .150 .100 -.026 - .017
(.182) ( .185) ( .180) (-184)
Capital intensity .237 . 135 .330 .184 .264 . 149 .376 .207
( .237) ( .252) ( .242) ( .257)
Defense expenditure -.063 - . 072 - . 014 - . 016 - . 045 - .049 - . 003 - . 003
( . 099) ( . 099) ( .104) ( .104)
Human capital - . 065 - . 039 . 093 .054 - .143 - . 077 . 035 .018
investment ( .189) ( .199) ( .209) ( .222)
Control Effects
1970 GNP per capita .256*** .501 .296*** .575 .293*** .572 .336*** .650
(.065) (. 070) (.068) (-073)
Largest variance
inflation factor 2.131 2.378 2.083 2 .312
R2 .471 .536 .499 .567
Adjusted R2 .394 .462 .419 .489
Number of cases 72 66 66 60
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting Countries, respectively, 
b = unstandardized regression coefficient with standard error in parenthesis;
Beta = standardized regression coefficient.
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is unlikely to be affected by foreign investment rates. 
Besides, the condition that the total income of OEC 
increased much more rapidly than their total output, due to 
changes in the price of oil relative to other goods, 
obscured their status of export dependence.
Looking at table 19, results of the period 1978-1990 
show that trade centrality is the most prominent variable 
in accounting for global economic growth across all 
regression models composed of different combinations of 
nations. The substantial increase of associations for trade 
centrality and growth between all-economies and CPE- 
excluded sample again indicates that centrally planned 
economies were still having difficulties in adopting a new 
role in the capitalist world-economy (Nee and Stark 1989; 
Sklair 1991). On the other hand, much less fluctuation in 
relative prices in oil products has magnified the 
significant and positive influences of trade centrality on 
economic growth. In addition, human capital investment 
became statistically significant in the sample excluding 
OEC and CPE. The investment in education may have shown its 
long-term positive effects for a country's development.
Table 20 shows that the effect between position in the 
trade network and economic growth for the pool years (1970- 
1990) mirrors that of the second period (1978-1990). Trade 
centrality attains significant positive effects on economic 
growth across all models. While capital penetration and
110
export intensity still exert statistically significant 
effects on economic growth, their effect is relatively 
modest.
Comparing Measures of Economic Growth
The relatively weak performance of the alternatively 
hypothesized variables may reflect the fact that previous 
research neglected the holistic feature of the global 
economy and the unique role played by individual nations in 
the international arena. Stated differently, most of the 
preceding studies were preoccupied by the political-economy 
ideology, and were aimed at exploring the exploitative 
potential of the world system. Consequently, measurements 
were latently designed to exert these asymmetric 
relationships between classes of countries.
To test this assumption, the initial dependent 
variables in the difference-of-logs models were substituted 
with two development indices - PQLI and HDI, both of which 
are constructed based on a country's position in the 
dichotomous world system. Table 21 reports the expected 
outcomes that the models are better explained by the 
dependence and industrialization variables - the adjusted 
R2 is .702 for PQLI and .713 for HDI. While the effects of 
network centrality variables disappeared, four alternative 
explanatory variables: export intensity, labor intensity, 
capital intensity, and defense expenditure, developed
Ill
Table 21. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth: Comparing Models 
of Dependent Variables
Independent Variable
PQLI (1978) HDI (1990)
b Beta b Beta
Economies
OEC -.186*** - .257 -.093* - .147
( .060) ( .050)
CPE .250*** .346 .109** .171
(.049) (.045)
All other countries contrast contrast
Growth Rates
Trade centrality . 008 . 010 . 066 . 091
(/S=.8) (.064) (.055)
Capital centrality . 044 .039 --- ---
(0=. 8) ( .082)
Labor centrality . 020 . 031 --- ---
(|S=. 8) (.045)
Capital penetration - . 006 - . 003 . 055 . 015
( .175) ( .288)
Primary export . 013 . 015 - . 060 - . 068
dependence ( .073) (.064)
Export intensity .140*** . 198 . 074 . 088
( .049) (.069)
Labor intensity - .103 - . 033 .259*** .223
( .249) (.084)
Capital intensity .560*** .292 - . 142 - . 085
( .168) (.129)
Defense expenditure . 055 . 069 .090* . 120
( .055) (.051)
Human capital - . 133 - . 077 . 024 . 015
investment ( .135) (.119)
Control Effects
1970 GNP per capita .333*** . 858 --- ---
(.040)
1978 GNP per capita -- -- .266*** . 861
( .023)
Largest variance 2 .468 1. 722
inflation factor
R2 . 757 .758
Adjusted R2 . 702 . 713
Number of cases 72 72
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting 
Countries, respectively, b = unstandardized regression 
coefficient with standard error in parenthesis; Beta = 
standardized regression coefficient.
statistically significant results. Not surprisingly, the 
results are quite consistent with those of 
dependency/world-system studies. Evidently, the 
compatibility of these results seems to narrow by indirect 
measures. Increasing network exchanges, direct and 
indirect, should have changed the direction and scope of 
measurements. Especially when the configurations of 
transactional interactions among countries are dramatically 
transformed by technological improvements, external 
influences and factors seem to be much broader and dynamic 
than political economy theorists usually imply.
Results for Reduced-Form Model
To find out if the effects of alternative explanatory 
variables on economic growth may have been suppressed, the 
regression models were reestimated without the intervening 
network variables. Table 22 reports the results for this 
reduced-form model. With the exceptions of significant 
differences between contrast groups of economies, none of 
the other coefficients for dependence, industrialization, 
defense expenditure, and human capital investment are 
statistically significant for two separate periods. As 
expected, however, capital penetration and capital 
intensity attain statistically significant effects on 
economic growth without the presence of centrality measures 
for the pool years (1970-1990) . Meanwhile, the significant
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Table 22. Regression Coefficients for Economic Growth 1970-1978, 1978- 
1990, and 1970-1990 on Reduced-Form Models
1970-1978 1978-1990 1970-1990
Independent Variable b Beta b Beta b Beta
Economies
OEC
CPE
All other countries
.280*** .450 
(.073)
.110* .177 
(.065)
contrast
-.376*** -.554 
( .073)
.055 .079 
(.071)
contrast
-.070 .602 
(.078)
.184* .194 
(.107)
contrast
Growth Rates
Capital penetration
Primary export 
dependence
- . 380 
( .228) 
. 109 
(.095)
- . 191 
.145
.019 .005 
( .453)
-.080 -.083 
(.100)
-.578** 
( .283)
. 119 
(.112)
- .224 
.141
Export intensity 
Labor intensity 
Capital intensity 
Defense expenditure
(
Human capital 
investment
- . 079 
(.065) 
. 476 
(.314) 
. 246 
( .216) 
. 068 
. 073)
. 101 
(.176)
- . 129 
. 178 
. 150 
.099
- . 068
-.041 -.045 
(.108)
-.120 -.095 
(.133)
.246 .136 
( .204)
-.027 -.034 
(.080)
.198 .113 • 
(.188)
- . 073
(. 077) 
.181 
(.204) 
.565** 
(.269)
- .127 
( .110)
- . 081
( .226)
- . 108 
.115 
.321
- . 146
- . 048
Control Effects
1978 GNP per capita .135*** .406 
(.050)
.170*** .507 
(.036)
.307*** 
( .078)
. 602
Largest variance 
inflation factor
2 . 230 1.600 2 . 178
R2
Adjusted R2
. 389 
. 289
.478 
. 392
.343
.235
R2 increment test* . 080** -.160*** -.157***
Number of cases 72 72 72
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p< . 01
"Comparing to models including centrality measures in table 15, 16, 
17. R2 for 1970-78, 1978-90, and 1970-90 are .469, .638, and .499,
, and
t
respectively.
Note: CPE and OEC denote Centrally Planned Economies and Oil Exporting 
Countries, respectively, b = unstandardized regression 
coefficient with standard error in parenthesis; Beta = 
standardized regression coefficient.
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effects of oil-exporting countries no longer exist.
Further, F-tests on the increments to R2 for additive 
network centrality variables are statistically significant 
in all three time periods.
Based on these findings, it would still be premature 
to suggest that increased involvement in the global economy 
is the exclusive solution or sufficient condition for 
promoting economic growth. Alternative external factors and 
internal determinants may provide contingent strategies for 
growth in the cases of less-developed countries or some 
nonincorporated regions in the global economic system. 
Looking at the overall economic system, however, the degree 
to which a country involves in the international 
transactional networks accounts for the most substantial 
influences. The results indicate that frequent and 
extensive contacts with the larger economic system are a 
necessary process for a country to attain economic growth.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Conclusion
The effect of fast-growing international 
interdependence on national economic growth has been the 
focus of comparative sociology and development studies. Yet 
the ascendant forces affecting the development of national 
economies - an external view of system structure and 
integration into the international economy - are relatively 
neglected. Based on data for 93 nations over a 20-year 
period (1970-1990) from three transactional networks (93 x 
93 matrices), I estimated the effects of involvement in the 
global trade, capital, and labor networks on economic 
growth. The results demonstrate that changes of structural 
positions in the external transaction networks have been 
important factors restructuring international global 
economic formation. Most importantly, increased 
transactional linkages within the international economy 
promote significant beneficial, rather than harmful, 
effects on a country's, economic growth.
Following the claim of increasing globalization of 
economic activities, two dimensions of analyses were 
developed as the theme of this research. First, the 
analysis focuses on restructuring in the global production 
networks and transforming dominance in the economic
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hierarchy. Second, the analysis aims at exploring the 
interplay between international linkages and economic 
growth.
Examining networks of trade, capital, and labor, the 
result shows that a global economic hierarchy can be 
identified as a continuum of roles rather than a stratified 
model or discrete clusters of countries, as world-systems 
analysts often employ. Furthermore, a number of countries 
have experienced drastic changes in their dominant 
positions in terms of rank and centrality score within the 
world economy. While the decrease of centrality score and 
rank occurs in countries across all regions in the world 
economy, most sharp increases are concentrated in the area 
of Asian Pacific and South Asia.
The analysis also supports the ecological view of 
vertical mobility in the multilevel economic hierarchy. The 
most noticeable change across all production networks is 
the extensive upward movements of positions in the 
subdominant level. Although the number of dominant 
countries remained virtually unchanged over the past two 
decades, the phenomenon of domination is one of somewhat 
stable but shifting alliances. Countries in the lower order 
level only achieved limited upward mobility.
Additionally, the trend of decentralization in 
multiple transactional networks is expected to continue for 
the entire system as well as for each major trading region.
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While decentralization in network dominance refers simply 
to the geographical spread of economic activities across 
national boundaries, global interdependence implies a 
degree of functional integration between these 
internationally dispersed activities (cf. Dicken 1992). As 
the frequency of contact with the larger system and the 
scope of interaction among countries expanded, the effects 
of geographical proximity became less pronounced than 
position in the production networks in affecting global 
economy.
Using difference-of-logs models of multiple regression 
analysis, centrality positions in the trade network 
presented consistently significant positive effects on 
economic growth throughout the analysis, with the exception 
of the model excluding oil-exporting countries between 197 0 
and 1978. Debates between development studies were 
generally centered on the beneficial or deteriorated 
effects of economic growth using indirect measures such as 
position in the world system, investment or trade 
dependence, levels of industrialization, military 
expenditure, and human capital investment. The effects of 
external factors - transactional linkages through trade 
networks exert much more positive influence on economic 
growth net of these alternative determinants.
This sharp contrast in the results indicates that 
increasing extensive contacts, rather than cutting ties
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with the international economy, may be the necessary 
processes in achieving economic growth. Moreover, the 
analysis shows that centrality variables using closeness 
measures, which emphasize the importance of both direct and 
indirect contacts and take the relative position of other 
countries into consideration, are better than those 
employing degree and competitive distance measures. Hence, 
indirect transactional interactions with other dominant 
countries also have provided positive effects for a 
country's economic performance, in addition to direct 
interactions (dyadic network flows).
To avoid the possibility of floor effects associated 
with GNP per capita, I include the initial levels of GNP as 
a separate variable to test the constant-effects assumption 
and remove the effects of initial scores on subsequent 
gains. The results provide the analysis with a substantive 
interpretation of GNP per capita and consistent effects of 
centrality variables. While wealthier countries continue to 
exhibit higher rates of economic growth, increased 
involvement in international economic activities also 
contribute to a country's growth.
Discussion
In a global perspective, it becomes immediately (and 
increasingly) apparent that the various national economies 
are highly interdependent. A complicated network of
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multilateral linkages, affecting virtually every country, 
is generated by merchandise and service trade flows, 
unilateral transfers, short- and long-term capital flows, 
and labor migration (Klein, Pauly, and Voisin 1982). The 
degree of involvement in the global economy and the 
increasing economic internationalization and its impact on 
growth is becoming the major concern of development 
studies.
In the theoretical perspective, however, previous 
research was preoccupied with the political economy 
paradigm, which asserts that structural transformations are 
strictly confined by stratum memberships in the world 
system. Thus, involvement in the global system, as measured 
by position in the world system, determines asymmetric 
patterns of exchange and reinforces the reproduction of 
global inequality and hierarchy. Although the diffusionist 
perspective draws results from broader and more systematic 
cross-regional comparisons, the emphasis of an 
international normative order and pro-development ideology 
has to cut across the First World/Third World divide. 
Undoubtedly, these viewpoints are essentially internal 
views of system structure. Social systems are regarded as 
either normatively and institutionally integrated in space 
and as possessing a unit functional character, or 
endogenously generated from class interests and relations 
of production (Irwin and Kasarda 1994).
Briefly, the importance of international contact 
networks which develop outside individual social systems 
are neglected. The trend of growing interdependence in the 
global economy do not just influence the links between 
individual countries and the international system. When 
changes in several countries are mutually reinforcing or 
when the weight of a single national actor in the system is 
large, they may have the effect of restructuring the 
international system as a whole. Drawing on the external 
view of social and spatial hierarchy put forth by human 
ecologists, this research demonstrates that economic 
interdependencies developed in terms of network positions 
and changes in the network centralities have been pivotal 
factors reorganizing international economies and creating 
competitive advantages for economic growth for countries 
centrally located in the global production networks.
As for the dynamic feature of this research, network 
centralities have increasingly positive long term effects 
on economic growth over both time periods (1970-1978, 197 8- 
1990). In the latter period (1978-1990), network 
interactions foster even greater effects on changes in 
relative dominant position and vertical mobility within the 
economic hierarchy. Besides, this trend of increasing 
contacts and interactions is interpenetrating countries 
across geographical regions and socio-economic systems.
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China's open-door policy beginning in 1978 positively 
contributes to the fast-growing economy and strengthened 
regional integration in the Pacific Rim area.
A series of dramatic social changes occurred after 
1990, such as the collapse of former Soviet Union, the 
reunion of East and West Germany, the initiation of the 
North America Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the development 
of Asia-Europe Forum (ASEM), and possibly the creation of a 
trans-Atlantic free-trade area (TAFTA) between the European 
Union and the United States in the near future. These 
changes suggest a growing multilateralization and 
interdependence of these regional blocs. In addition, the 
present research shows that the overall network 
centralization has declined over the past two decades, 
suggesting that the degree to which a network is dominated 
by a few countries has decreased between 197 0-197 8 and 
1978-1990. As the world economy continues to change from a 
regionally-integrated system to a globally-linked system, 
the transformation of the world economic hierarchy should 
become more of a multicentric structure. Hence, broad 
socio-spatial distinctions like core/periphery or First 
World/Third World should become less meaningful.
While the results of this analysis show extensive 
changes in network positions and upward mobility in the 
global economy, we have to note that international mobility 
is not a zero-sum game (Chase-Dunn 1983; Chirot 1977).
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Clearly, upward mobility does not necessarily mean a 
reduction of global material inequality. As Dahrendorf 
(1959) asserts, the structure of a social formation remains 
the same, dominant and dominated groups, but the occupants 
change. Dominant and dominated are relative terms, not 
absolute.
Despite insignificant performances for capital and 
labor networks in predicting economic growth, these 
measures have been shown to be important factors explaining 
changes of a country's relative position and vertical 
movement in the global economic structure. The weak 
associations between capital network and growth may be due 
partly to its considerable sensitivity to regulation and 
policy of markets or incompatibility between political 
units (nations) and capital movements (multinational 
banks). A broader input using other network measures of 
capital investments including foreign aid, foreign direct 
investment, and foreign loans may enhance the levels of 
causal interpretations.
Due to a lack of measures for the extent and 
distribution of foreign employment between countries, the 
study of the relationship between labor movements (measured 
by ethnic diversity) and economic growth has focused on the 
links between the dominant ethnic group and foreign capital 
penetration. It is argued that ethnicity-state 
relationships can provide important incentives for state
123
elites to actively encourage the penetration of 
international capital, for the sake of sustaining the state 
in a form that insures that a given ethnic group keeps its 
privileged position in the state structure (Enloe 1980) .
The present research has addressed a more immediate 
investigation between labor network and growth. However, 
the measure (nationality of foreign worker) employed is 
insufficient to separate the effects of "labor flow" from 
"labor stock" - refer to "current account inflows of 
foreign workers for some time period," and "total 
accumulated number of foreign-born workers in a country," 
respectively (cf. Firebaugh 1992, p.117). Stated 
differently, measures of labor stock may have incorporated 
influences from the factor of ethnic enclaves. Nonetheless, 
this preliminary analysis may provide useful directions for 
further measurement, with special attention paid to the 
dynamic and historical features of labor flows.
Thus, future research of multiple transactional 
networks in the growth of global economy must continue to 
explore the interrelations among overlapping exchange 
networks. In the globally networked economy, nations as 
competing organizational actors have to seek productive 
niches or necessary resources in the process of territorial 
spread and functional integration within the international 
economy. While network positions provide critical 
theoretical and empirical determinants of changes and
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growth in the global economic structure, the interplay 
between economic, political, and technological factors have 
to be considered for a more comprehensive explanation of 
growing competition in the international arena.
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Appendix A. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for All Variables in
the Analysis, 1970-1978
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Economic Growth Rate 1.000
(2) PQLI .168 1.000
(3) Primary Export Dependence -.063 .111 1.000
(4) Export Intensity -.166 .245 -.167 1.000
(5) Capital Penetration -.202 -.053 .401 -.071 1.000
(6) Labor Intensity .033 -.335 -.159 -.156 .044 1.000
(7) Capital Intensity .116 -.234 -.264 -.075 -.225 .186 1.000
(8) Defense Expenditure .089 -.117 -.039 -.012 -.065 .084 .001 1.000
(9) Human Capital Investment .048 -.392 -.136 .042 -.049 .228 .160 -.061 1.000
(10) Trade Centrality (/?=.8) .409 -.123 -.262 .009 -.218 .209 .319 -.009 .228 1.000
(11) Trade Centrality (0=.O) .340 -.115 -.297 .048 -.271 .164 .393 .082 .175 .803 1.000
(12) Trade Centrality (/?=-.8) .245 .177 -.051 -.005 .005 -.024 -.190 .016 -.094 .025 .109 1.000
(13) Labor Centrality (j8=.8) .098 -.072 -.276 -.062 -.204 .129 .043 .060 .093 .041 .125 -.062
(14) Labor Centrality (/?=.0) .053 -.138 -.204 -.098 -.104 .036 .006 .049 .005 .036 .099 -.054
(15) Labor Centrality (/?=-.8) -.099 -.076 -.217 .050 .049 .003 .031 -.056 .043 .003 .025 .129
(16) Capital Centrality (j3=.8) .121 .217 -.040 .140 -.028 .110 -.235 .011 -.023 .110 .109 .122
(17) Capital Centrality (/?=.0) .085 .166 .027 .021 -.019 .003 -.164 .114 .041 .003 .006 .095
(18) Capital Centrality (/?=-.8) .057 .066 .087 -.039 -.008 .019 -.066 -.017 .051 .019 .023 .080
(19) GNP per capita (1970) .179 .711 .103 .109 -.008 -.445 -.531 -.163 -.418 -.092 -.054 .326
Mean .43 1.80 -.12 .08 -.01 .04 .02 .05 .13 .00 .12 .00
Standard Deviation .17 .20 .23 .28 .09 .06 .11 .25 .12 .25 .26 .01
Minimum .04 1.18 -.97 -.46 -.32 -.11 -.19 -.54 -.03 -.88 -.68 -.04
Maximum 1.14 1.99 .58 1.16 .54 .27 .39 .85 .48 .80 1.08 .05
(Appendix con'd .)
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Variables (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
(13) Labor Centrality (/?=.8) 1.000
(14) Labor Centrality (/?=.0) .885 1.000
(15) Labor Centrality (0=-.8) .068 .220 1.000
(16) Capital Centrality ()3= .8) .017 -.053 -.285 1.000
(17) Capital Centrality (/3=.0) .086 .047 -.375 .659 1.000
(18) Capital Centrality (0=-.8) .104 .067 -.401 .345 .751 1.000
(19) GNP per capita (1970) .188 -.127 .053 -.131 -.067 .175 1.000
Mean .07 .13 .00 .01 -.04 .00 2.77
Standard Deviation .32 .35 .01 .18 .18 .02 .52
Minimum -.99 -1.19 -.05 -.41 -.49 -.06 1.78
Maximum 1.32 1.23 .05 .56 1.06 .12 3.70
Note: Logged variables were used for all variables. Correlations among different centrality 
levels (variables 10 through 12, 13 through 15, and 16 through 18) and two dependent 
variables (variable 1 and 2) are reported but these variables never appear together 
in a model.
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Appendix B. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for All Variables in the
Analysis, 1978-1990
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) Economic Growth Rate 1.000
(2) HDI .482 1.000
(3) Primary Export Dependence -.198 -.016 1.000
(4) Export Intensity -.061 -.057 -.217 1.000
(5) Capital Penetration -.152 -.068 -.086 .561 1.000
(6) Labor Intensity -.205 .072 -.075 -.016 .155 1.000
(7) Capital Intensity .020 -.372 -.327 .274 .097 -.022 1.000
(8) Defense Expenditure -.011 .129 .145 -.143 -.062 .152 -.148 1.000
(9) Human Capital Investment -.156 -.124 -.002 .004 -.034 .351 .038 .033 1.000
(10) Trade Centrality (/?=.8) .581 .119 -.298 .178 -.022 -.087 .165 .110 -.187 1.000
(11) Trade Centrality (/S=.0) .200 -.173 -.253 .175 .047 .034 .172 055 -.069 .733 1.000
(12) Trade Centrality (/?=-.8) -.091 -.050 -.193 .172 .098 .030 -.011 -.001 .154 .096 .235 1.000
(13) GNP per capita (1970) .375 .759 .103 -.171 -.178 -.205 -.343 -.086 -.160 -.074 -.351 -.074 1.000
Mean .24 -.14 -.08 .04 .00 -.07 -.01 .01 .08 -.02 .00 .06 3.20
Standard Deviation .19 .18 ’ .20 .21 .05 .15 .11 .24 .11 .25 .01 .27 .57
Minimum -.36 -.84 -.73 -.94 -.25 -.48 -.48 .75 -.18 -.09 -.03 -1.18 2.04
Maximum .66 .00 .98 .56 .12 .30 .26 .84 .54 1.05 .02 .97 4.18
Note: Logged variables were used for all variables. Correlations among different centrality levels (variables 10 through 12) and two 
dependent variables (variable 1 and 2) are reported but these variables never appear together in a model.
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Appendix C. Countries Included in Multiple Network Analysis
West Europe
Australia 
New Zealand 
Austria
Belgium-Luxembourg
Denmark
Finland
France
German, Federal Republic of
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway0
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
East Europe
Bulgaria15
Czechoslovakia15
German Democratic Republic15
USSR0
Cyprus
Hungary15
Malta
Poland15
Romania15
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Subsaharan Africa
Angola0
Cameroon
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire0
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Nigeria3
Rwanda
South Africa
Tanzania
Tunisia
Zambia
North and Latin America
United States
Canada
Argentina
Bahamas, The0
Barbados0
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba0
Dominican Republic0
Ecuador
Honduras
Jamaica0
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Uruguay0
Venezuela3
North Africa and Southwest Asia
Algeria0
Bahrain0
Egypt
Iran0
Iraq0
Israel
Kuwait3
Lebanon0
Libya3
Morocco
Saudi Arabia3
Syrian Arab Republic0
Asian Pacific and South Asia 
Japan
Bangladesh
China15
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia3
Korea, South
Macau0
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore0
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam0
Taiwan0
30il Exporting countries. 
bCentrally planned economies.
°Not included in the multiple regression models.
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